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	<title>Miquel Vila, Author at Palladium</title>
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		<title>The Mirage of European Sovereignty
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		<link>https://www.palladiummag.com/2022/11/09/the-mirage-of-european-sovereignty/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Miquel Vila]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Nov 2022 21:36:51 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi dreamed of a united Europe led by a new spiritual aristocracy. Known today as the EU's grandfather, his dream is largely forgotten.</p>
The post <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2022/11/09/the-mirage-of-european-sovereignty/">The Mirage of European Sovereignty
</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/">Palladium</a>.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In 1923, the release of the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Pan-Europa</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> manifesto shocked intellectual life in Europe. It was an instant best-seller and was translated into all major European languages. Its chief success was the establishment of a European federalist movement. Three years later, the first pan-European congress was held in Austria. For the attendees, Vienna—which had lost its Habsburg empire just a few years before—became the capital of Europe again. The event was a personal triumph for the manifesto’s mysterious author: Richard Nikolaus Eijiro, Count of Coudenhove-Kalergi.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Kalergi had roots on several continents. He was born in Japan, the son of an Austrian diplomat and a Japanese mother. Among the many bloodlines in his father’s ancestry were Greek, Flemish, and Venetian nobles, as well as Byzantine emperors. He didn’t set foot in Europe until he was ten, arriving in Vienna just a few years before the First World War, which would destroy the multi-ethnic Habsburg empire. As the expatriate son of an aristocratic family with estates across Europe, he never had a strong national identity. After 1918, he held a Czechoslovak passport; after 1939, a French one that he retained until he died. He felt European because he couldn’t be anything else. Having seen Europe pitted against itself in mechanized trench warfare, a continent at peace was the only cause he could naturally support.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The manifesto made immediate enemies in a time of rising nationalism. Kalergi’s origins didn’t go unnoticed: Adolf Hitler singled him out as a “cosmopolitan bastard” in </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Mein Kampf, </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">a</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">title which later served to name Martyn Bond’s </span><a href="https://www.mqup.ca/hitler-s-cosmopolitan-bastard-products-9780228005452.php"><span style="font-weight: 400;">biography</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of the Bohemian diplomat. Beyond a dislike of Kalergi’s ethnic origins, his opposition to antisemitism, and his conciliatory views with America, Hitler saw him as a rival in creating a new European order.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Modern political divides color today’s perceptions of Kalergi. Both contemporary supporters and detractors like to portray him as the equivalent of today’s Davos man, an early theorist of globalism. Any online search of Kalergi’s name immediately brings up the conspiracy theory of the Kalergi Plan: based on a fragment of text from his twenties, he becomes the central figure in an intergenerational plan to replace Europe’s population with Africans. But it is difficult to believe that someone who feared decolonization and wrote in a letter to De Gaulle that the “UN represents for Europe, indeed for the whole of the white race, the worst danger since the days of Genghis Khan” is simultaneously the mind behind the Europe of the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">banlieues</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Opposed to both the domination of a single European power as well as Europe’s subjugation by either Soviet Russia or the United States, he proposed a political order founded on the spiritual rebirth of the continent’s elites. Nonetheless, his story is ultimately one of failure. Kalergi cannot be singularly blamed for Europe’s problems today, but he is not entirely innocent either. The count reflected many of the strategic missteps of twentieth-century Europe’s post-aristocratic elites. Like them, he longed for a lost empire, but ultimately lacked the ability and will to change Europe’s course in history. </span></p>
<h3>The Roots of Pan-Europa</h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As he began to write in the aftermath of the First World War, Kalergi found himself in agreement with the narrative of civilizational decline promoted by thinkers like Oswald Spengler. In </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Pan-Europa, </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">he explained that the era of European national empires had reached its twilight. Technological developments, as well as the human and material loss caused by the Great War, called for a new European political organization. Being a European born in Japan, he had seen how little the differences between European nations mattered in the eyes of non-Europeans: as he later explained in his 1959 autobiography:</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">“we were conscious of the fact that Europe represented, above all national dissensions, a single branch of humanity.” From the geographical point of view alone, “the European continent does not exist. There only exists a European peninsula of the Eurasian continent.” What made Europe a separate entity from greater Eurasia was not a geographic separation, but its position as a distinct civilization.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Looking ahead, Kalergi divided the world into five large spaces: a Pan-American hemisphere led by the United States, the continuing British Empire, the Soviet Union, a Pan-Asian space led by Japan, and Pan-Europa—which, despite its name, also included the vast European colonial territories in Africa. In a world where continental power superseded national power, Kalergi thought Europeans should come together and share their resources and colonies to ensure Europe’s survival. Moreover, Kalergi considered that a United States of Europe could not only protect the independence of European peoples but thrive as one of Earth’s five ruling empires.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The young count initially sympathized with the pacifist movement of the 1920s and with Wilsonian ideas. He supported the League of Nations—a forum in which he would work to promote his Pan-European vision—and the idea of an international order based on the application of international law to enforce peace. The topic of global peace remained one of his enduring philosophical and political interests; already in </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Pan-Europa, </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">a central point of his argument for European unification was that “if peace is assured in the continent, the path will be open for the world peace.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, his views differed in their essence from liberal internationalism. In his descriptions of the inner workings of international politics, there are traces of early-twentieth-century geopolitical thinkers like Halford Mackinder or Karl Haushofer—a friend of the Coudenhove-Kalergi family. He believed that international peace was only possible through a balance of hard power. For Kalergi, the United States of Europe was founded first on geopolitical self-interest, even if it might have beneficial effects for the whole world. As </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Pan-Europa</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> warned its readers, the alternative to European unity was that “as occurred yesterday with China and Turkey…England, Russia, and America will divide [Europe] in different zones of influence.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But despite Kalergi’s interest in post-war liberal democratic projects, his motivating worldview was quite distinct from that of Wilson and his European collaborators. Despite his reputation as a forward-thinking cosmopolitan, an imperial heritage informed Kalergi’s fears for Europe’s future.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For the aristocracy to which Kalergi belonged, the external threat of the rising powers—Soviet Russia and liberal America—corresponded to the internal threat of socialist revolt. To make things worse, victory during the war meant that Britain and France still had their eyes closed to the reality that their position was only possible thanks to the borrowed might of the U.S. But Kalergi’s noble lineage came from the now-defeated Central European empires. The abdication of Emperor Karl in 1918 was a massive psychological blow, but one that Kalergi believed let Europe see itself more clearly. The humiliation of Austria would be the future of all of Europe.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Despite his openness to Bismarck-style social democratic policies, Kalergi retained an aristocratic view of society. He did not believe that the project of European renewal could happen unless Europe’s elite classes recognized their position and began to renew themselves, specifically. That required a new vision for both Europe and European elites to rally around. This vision, the core of Kalergi’s project, was one built on the assumptions of the now-vanishing Hapsburg world.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The nostalgic portrait that Kalergi draws in </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">An Idea Conquers the World </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">mimics his vision of what Pan-Europa should be: </span></p>
<blockquote><p><span style="font-weight: 400;">[W]hile all other great cities of the Continent were national centers, Vienna alone was international, capital of the only international empire. This vast empire had a population of fifty-five millions, split into nineteen different nationalities. But together they formed a natural geographic and economic unit.</span></p></blockquote>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Austria-Hungary had balanced tradition and progress in ways Kalergi found superior to the upheavals further west. It had been a scientifically modern state that had experienced no significant revolutions; a common market with no homogenizing national identity; a hub of new ideas in science and politics in which the Church’s traditional power remained immense. At its heart was Vienna, a deeply traditional imperial capital that was simultaneously home to Europe’s leading intellectuals.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;"> </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">The United States of Europe that Kalergi proposed reflected his Austrian environs. In </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Totalitarian State Against Man</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">,</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">he supported corporatist economic structures </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">based on </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">“the agricultural co-operatives, which combine all the advantages of private property with the spirit of brotherhood and reciprocal aid.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">” Here, Kalergi was also inspired by the organic federalist tradition of Switzerland—a country born out of opposition to the Habsburgs—and its concentric circles of authority. These would lead from families to communes, communes to cantons, and eventually to a continental federation. Undergirding these experimental concepts was an aristocratic ideal with imperial roots: “neither democracy nor dictatorship, but only chivalry and brotherhood of the spirit and respect for the individual, can protect the rights of national and religious minorities.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Habsburgs had seen themselves as Catholic rulers, heirs of the Roman Empire and of Charlemagne; Kalergi believed that these same sources should inform a common </span><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1016/0191-6599%2893%2990229-J?journalCode=rhei20"><span style="font-weight: 400;">European soul</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> which was “Christian in-depth, Hellenic in width, Germanic in height.” Despite his friendliness to Wilsonian ideas, the ultimate political form was widely adaptable. By recovering this cosmopolitan ideal of a “dynasty of international origin and an aristocracy which merged all branches of blood and civilization,” Kalergi believed that the ethnic and class conflicts of his era could end in reconciliation instead of war. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Not surprisingly, it was among Austrian elites that Kalergi found his first backers for the Pan-European Union, an organization dedicated to popularizing his ideas. The inter-war Austrian government would become a major backer, extending support to the group until the assassination of Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss at the hands of the Nazis. </span></p>
<h3>Aristocracy of the Spirit</h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, Kalergi’s influence did not remain confined only to Austria. During the 1920s and early 1930s, he built a continental network with him at its center. The young count understood the importance of propaganda and the need to convince influential leaders in political and intellectual life to join his movement. Those who bought his book received a prepaid letter to join the Pan-European Movement. These tactics helped the movement to grow at a fast pace, capitalizing on the success of Kalergi’s best-seller. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Kalergi was accustomed to Vienna’s aristocratic society, and soon married the successful actress Ida Roland. Marrying an actress was class treason in those days, particularly from the perspective of his Japanese mother, who temporarily disowned him for the offense. The power couple had excellent networking skills, often meeting with politicians and intellectuals like the writer Thomas Mann, the German industrialist Robert Bosch, and the banker Max Warburg, who ended up funding the Pan-European Movement. At the pinnacle of his interwar fame, Kalergi enjoyed a direct line to the prominent French statesman Aristide Briand and the Weimar-era Foreign Minister for Germany, Gustav Stresemann.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In July 1929, Aristide Briand announced that he would present a plan to launch a “European Union” in the League of Nations the following year. Briand’s plan included the idea of a pan-European security alliance and the opening of a common market. He stated the need for Europeans to cooperate against common threats and build an enduring peace. Outside France, however, many saw this as a French maneuver to take over Europe. Supporters in the press welcomed Briand’s proposal, reflecting a pro-European attitude Kalergi had invested years of proselytism into promoting. In the League of Nations that September, Stresemann responded in cautious but positive terms to Briand’s proposal. He presented the long-time German position on the topic: the importance of economic discipline in a united Europe and the need to remove trade barriers to alleviate Europe’s economic hardships. That was followed by a discussion among various national representatives, where Italy also showed sympathy for the idea of a united Europe. Only Britain would maintain an uncompromising opposition to the idea. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The next year, as promised, Briand presented a clearer plan in the League of Nations. It was obvious that any tangible results would need a long path, yet it seemed that the current state of opinion among European elites might bring Kalergi’s dream into a reality. But by then, the tide had already begun to turn. The 1929 global economic meltdown would accelerate the decay of an already-unstable social balance across Europe, and become the beginning of the end of Kalergi’s momentum. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Until 1929, Kalergi’s movement had kept gaining steam. It was ideologically eclectic in this era, including a range of ideologies from social democracy to fascism. His book gained positive reviews among a spectrum that included French socialists, German social democrats, Austrian conservatives, and Spanish Francoists. Kalergi’s own position on this spectrum is hard to pin down, in part because he made sure to present a politically ecumenical face to his audience. He liked to present himself on the side of the ideas of science and progress, sharing many sympathies with the achievements of enlightened liberalism. But socially, he felt far more comfortable with conservatives than with socialists. Despite his personal friendships on the French left, for example, he was unhappy with the victory of the socialist Prime Minister Leon Blum in 1936.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The count remained an uncompromising opponent of Nazism from the outset but supported authoritarian leaders in other countries. He was an early enthusiast of Mussolini, whom he met several times and in whom he claimed to see a new “European Napoleon.” Shortly after Mussolini came to power, the count wrote him a letter—reproduced in his 1953 autobiography—in which he declared that “Europe must proclaim its own Monroe Doctrine: Europe for the Europeans.” He also called Mussolini the “heir of Marius and Caesar,” and exhorted him to “save Europe.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At his core, Kalergi was an aristocratic elitist, open to certain progressive ideas but most comfortable in his own class. His product was addressed to those responsible for Europe’s political future and his European revolution was a revolution from above.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Kalergi’s vision did include a form of democracy, but it was democracy valued as a means, not an end. He expressed his concern that </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">“</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">democracy believes more in number than in value, more in luck than in greatness.” Despite this, democracy could play a role by ensuring turnover among failed nominal elites: “political democracy can only be fruitful and creative when it has smashed the pseudo-aristocracy of birth and gold to replace it with a new aristocracy of spirit and mind.” In </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Nobility, </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">published in 1922, he argued that democracy was a transitory moment,</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">“an interlude between the old feudal aristocracy, based on birth, and the aristocracy of the future, based, as it will be, on mental and moral superiority.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">His Hapsburg cultural sympathies ideologically translated into something like political Platonism, informed by anti-materialist sentiments about history and society. Although he had no problem courting financially well-established donors, Kalergi was not fond of the “pseudo-aristocracy of money.” As he explained in </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Practical Idealism</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> “the consummate aristocrat is an aristocrat of both the will and the mind, but is neither Junker [the conservative Prussian landed nobility, whose ranks included Bismarck and von Hindenburg] nor literati. He combines vision with willpower.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Kalergi was not fascinated by the rule of the expert but of the great statesman. For Kalergi, the quality of a civilization wasn’t dependent on race or political system, but on the quality of its elites, and on the ideas and thoughts that moved their leaders. Kalergi’s “aristocracy of the spirit” is both educated and eager to lead. Speaking about his father, Heinrich von Coudenhove-Kalergi, he recounted in his autobiography that “[t]here was no doubt that my father, although a private citizen, was the first man of his region…He was aware of his responsibilities, and he exercised his authority in the most human and patriarchal way. Everybody in need came to him to ask for help; and where he could, he gave.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In focusing on an aristocracy of the spirit, Kalergi attempted to reconcile the European aristocratic tradition with meritocratic institutions “like the Chinese Mandarins or the Catholic Church.” The heroic ideals of his pan-European elite would not be the gain of privileges, but of responsibilities.</span></p>
<h3>The Fall of Europe</h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Despite his newfound fame, Kalergi was neither the inventor of European unification nor its only advocate. The most important of his competitors was Prinz Rohan—another Austrian aristocrat—and his </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Europäischer Kulturbund</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Rohan was more traditionalist than Kalergi, but equally politically eclectic in his alliances. Rohan’s approach was less oriented towards building the United States of Europe and more towards promoting a shared European culture. Thanks to his manifesto, Kalergi was much more successful than Rohan, who would end up joining the NSDAP and having his movement co-opted by the Third Reich. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, the fate of Kalergi’s rival highlights how the surge of ideologically diverse pro-European activism and the developmental imperialism of fascism and Nazism were two responses to the same question. All were projects supported by sections of the European elite to solve the social question of class conflict—brought to the fore by returning veterans and the Great Depression—and to secure their portion of global power from the advance of Russia and America. Despite Hitler’s repeated attacks on Kalergi, the Third Reich itself would implement its own “New Order” in Europe under military conquest, seeing German hegemony as the only way to resist American and British influence. Distinct in its racial ideology, its geopolitical logic ended up being very similar to that of progressive advocates of a united Europe.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the political turmoil of the inter-war era, Kalergi would come to sit somewhere in between the tradition of enlightened European liberalism and the Conservative Revolution of the 1920s and ‘30s. His advocacy of peace and scientific progress, and his lionization of figures like Bonaparte, existed side by side with a fear of civilizational decline and a sense of elitism that can be found in rightist authors like Oswald Spengler, Eugeni d’Ors, Ortega y Gasset, or Ernst Jünger.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ultimately, this instinct against populism and mass mobilization may have been the Pan-European movement’s barrier to greater political power. Pan-Europa’s propaganda mostly targeted Europe’s intellectual and political elites. In the beginning, this helped Kalergi’s voice reach the most prestigious circles of continental Europe. Kalergi was never the populist type, like Mussolini. But in the midst of a social crisis, it was his populist opponents that were able to pressure establishment leaders into opening the institutions of power to them. Many elites might have been intellectually sympathetic to the idea of a united Europe, but saw a better candidate to protect their position in mass parties with street power than Kalergi’s toothless Pan-European Union. Pan-Europa also suffered from a second weakness: the institutions targeted by nationalist and socialist movements were those of existing states, whereas the political project of a united Europe required institutions that had not yet been built.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This mix of disadvantages proved fatal for the European movement. With the rise of communist agitation and rising violence as rival movements brawled in the streets, European elites weren’t willing to take their chances. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One of those authoritarian regimes was the one led by Engelbert Dollfuss, who seized power in Austria in 1932. Kalergi became his close collaborator. Despite their differences, Kalergi and Dollfuss agreed that German Nazism had become as much a threat to Austria as communism. Kalergi, no instinctual democrat himself, believed that a coalition of authoritarian regimes could still work together in a Pan-European project.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, Pan-Europa faced an even deeper problem. For all his writing about an “aristocracy of the spirit,” it seemed increasingly clear that no such force was going to constitute itself—and so, by his own model, there was no vehicle for the project to be achieved. The nation-state remained unchallenged as the real seed of power. Neither France nor Germany were yielding their interests in favor of the European cause. A European spiritual elite might have existed in the cafes of writers like Stefan Zweig</span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">,</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> but their influence was limited in the realm of politics. Many intellectuals and even European statesmen had declared that Pan-Europa was a beautiful idea. It was not enough.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In 1933, Hitler rose to power and took control of Germany, one of the countries where Kalergi had a large network. The Pan-European idea began to crumble. Soon after, in 1934, Austria suffered a pro-Nazi coup and a group of Austrian Nazis assassinated Dollfuss himself. Kalergi would go on to call him a “martyr of Europe.” Austria was soon incorporated into the Third Reich. Kalergi, married to a Jewish woman, knew that staying in Austria was not an option.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Luckily for him, Dolfuss’s killing had set off alarm bells in Rome. Hearing of the events, Mussolini pondered retaliating against Hitler. He had considered an independent Austria a vital part of guaranteeing Italian independence. Enraged by the killing, Mussolini promised to aid Austria in the event of German invasion and even erected a statue of the ancient Roman general Drusus, who had led conquests of German territory. Kalergi took advantage of the moment. When </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Anschluss</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> began in 1938, the count’s family, along with Dollfuss’s own widow, were escorted by a roundabout route to Switzerland by Italian soldiers. With the German annexation of Austria complete, the last state friendly to the Pan-European movement had fallen.</span></p>
<h3>The Rise of the Anglosphere</h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">After fleeing Austria, Kalergi anticipated another world war and decided not to take any chances. Kalergi had visited the U.S. in 1925 intending to set up a branch of the Pan-European movement but had not been successful. Now he settled in New York, teaching at New York University and Columbia. This time, his activism found better soil. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Apart from internal destruction by inter-European wars and the growth of the Soviet Union, Kalergi believed that Europe was threatened by the economic and political domination of the United States and, to a lesser degree, Great Britain. Relative to Russian expansionism—whether Tsarist or Soviet—the dependence on America and Britain was of secondary concern. After all, he still considered the U.S. part of a greater European cultural area</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">that also included Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. But ultimately, such domination was something the United States of Europe ought to prevent. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the past, London had made its top foreign policy priority to prevent any power in the continent from achieving unity among its major states, which is precisely what Kalergi wanted. To prevent continuing British interference, the count used his diplomatic skills to find supporters in the UK. These attempts bore fruit: Kalergi gained the ear of Britain’s wartime prime minister Winston Churchill. Kalergi would go on to help Churchill lobby in favor of U.S. intervention in the war. Later, his advice even inspired Churchill’s speech in Zurich in 1946 about European unity and was an essential boost for the post-war European movement. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Despite his growing Anglosphere ties, the count was always unsure if the UK should be part of Pan-Europa. Britain still had the largest colonial empire on Earth, and Kalergi believed that Britain’s natural role was to be the leader of an Indo-Pacific federation that grew out of this body—a concept popular among a number of British thinkers at the time, such as Lord Milner. Even if Britain lost its empire, it would still have much stronger ties with the U.S. than with continental Europe. For Kalergi, the natural role of the UK seemed to be fixed outside Europe, but as a neighbor close to Europe—an entente that should be sustained from both sides. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The U.S., however, was a more serious concern. The Hapsburg dynasty that Kalergi’s family had served for centuries was now lost, in part a result of U.S. intervention in European affairs during World War I. In his manifesto, Kalergi hoped that both would focus on what he saw as their natural spheres of influence: “If Pan-Europa starts from the same pacific and democratic principles as Pan-America, [there] will not be in the future any rivalry between these two sister unions, but only solidarity.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It seems that Kalergi saw the Monroe Doctrine as a purely defensive policy for the U.S. However, even by this time, the U.S. was reaching far beyond the Pan-American sphere, directly involving itself in both Europe and Asia. As with many Europeans of the early twentieth century, Kalergi’s view of America seems to try and sweeten a bitter reality that he himself acknowledged more explicitly by 1953: “by reason of its wealth and power, the United States was in a position not only to delay the unification of Europe but, if it so wished, even to prevent it altogether.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">During the war, Hitler’s unification of Europe under his own New Order served to alienate many Americans from the possibility of European unity entirely. Kalergi believed that he had to convince U.S. politicians that a future pan-European Union was in Washington’s own long-term interest. In 1940, in a lecture given at the Council on Foreign Relations, he stated his case in more analytical terms: “technical progress makes it imperative for Europe to unite.” Thus, he explained, the U.S. had to decide if it would be under the leadership of “Fascism, Bolshevism or Democracy.” Kalergi put his networking skills to work, meeting President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on several occasions, and later convincing Harry Truman that the U.S. should support European integration. Indeed, Kalergi attributed to himself the fact that the Marshall Plan set up the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">After the end of the Second World War, Europe was more materially devastated and more morally broken even than the Great War. The continent was to be divided between the U.S. and Russia. The European integration process that followed was built as part of the international liberal order that would secure U.S. global influence against its new Soviet enemy. As a deal for European unity, it was closer to the Western European equivalent of the Warsaw Pact than the start of a European superpower.</span></p>
<h3>The Exhaustion of a Continent</h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">After the war, Kalergi came back to Europe imagining a new moment of triumph. However, he would progressively be relegated to a symbolic position. In 1948, the Hague gathered the first Congress of Europe. It was a triumph for the future of European integration, becoming the first step for the foundation of the Council of Europe. But it was a clear defeat for Kalergi, who saw his moment stolen by Duncan Sandy, Winston Churchill’s son-in-law, who soon became leader of the much more influential European Movement. The spoils of victory, not ideological continuity, determined who reconstituted the European project.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Kalergi was a good propagandist, networker, and lobbyist. But he had little success when he attempted to directly involve himself in governmental politics. Once European integration was no longer a debate among socialites in Viennese coffee houses, but a discussion among bureaucrats in closed offices, his influence dwindled. He was from an older world. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">More politically astute rivals like the French official Jean Monnet took his place. Monnet had advised Aristide Briand in his unsuccessful plan for European unity before the war and had realized that the compelling, visionary ideas promoted by men like Kalergi would always fail when they became mistrusted by national governments, which would never just happily merge into a European confederation. Kalergi saw the core questions of sovereign power, such as those of foreign relations and the nature of European political union, as the most important ones. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">What Monnet desired was an accumulative process in which European states would learn to cooperate on specific issues first, ceding their sovereignty to bureaucratic European institutions with a limited scope. Monnet’s method was the one that would end up giving tangible results, like the European Coal and Steel Community and the design of the institutional architecture of the early European Union. As Kalergi biographer Martyn Bond put it, Monnet would become the father of Europe, while Kalergi was relegated to being its grandfather. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Despite his marginalization, Kalergi still retained his prestige and many contacts. The Pan-European Union was, in theory, a movement with different national branches. In practical terms, it was a one-man show. So Kalergi continued lobbying for the support of the great statesmen of Europe. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The rivalry with Sandy affected Kalergi’s relationship with Winston Churchill, who he stopped depending on. Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic of Germany’s first chancellor, was one of the leaders most interested in European integration, but the weakened West German state was fearful of French ambitions. Moreover, Adenauer would never attempt to defy U.S. interests in Europe. In Paris, it was a different story: De Gaulle was willing to keep his own counsel, and became the last great friend of Kalergi’s career.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Kalergi and De Gaulle shared that Europe should be a politically driven entity. A union based solely on economic interest would always be fragile. And both agreed that a directorate of its larger countries should rule Europe and prioritize recovering global ambitions.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Kalergi, like De Gaulle, seems to have begun to realize what it really meant for Europe to be under the United States security umbrella. As Kalergi would write in 1959, the Suez Crisis was a moment of reckoning. The Anglo-French attempt to</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> overthrow Nasser had been stopped “not by the United Nations but by the combined vetoes of Washington and Moscow: Europe&#8217;s two greatest powers were unable to resist this double pressure.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">De Gaulle was interested in keeping Kalergi afloat and put him under the tab of the French government. The count, for his part, saw in De Gaulle a new European great man that could lead Europe’s renaissance. Kalergi would write to De Gaulle in a similar tone as he had done to Mussolini years before, assuring him that European youth would “march towards the United States of Europe—if only they had a Leader. They would follow [De Gaulle] with enthusiasm if you would only place yourself at the head of this glorious revolution.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But despite these ideals, Europe was taking a very different path. As Quinn Slobodian narrates in </span><a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674979529"><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Globalists</span></i></a><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">,</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the younger generation behind the scenes—those designing the institutional bodies of the future European Union—saw it as part of a global assemblage of the liberal order. For people like Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, member of the Mont Pelerin Society and special</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> adviser to the European Commission from the 1960s to the ‘70s, Europe’s grandeur</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">was irrelevant in the face of the economic ideal of a common global market.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Mestmäcker framed the Treaty of Rome as the inauguration of the institutional architecture of the international liberal order in Europe. The newborn European community limited the capacity of the state to introduce controls on international trade within their national economic policy. The goal was never to give birth to a European great power. For Mestmäcker, the virtue of the EEC was that it was taking away the autonomy of European states without generating a new sovereign entity.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">After two world wars, the progressive loss of their colonial empires, and the menace of communism, European elites seemed to lose their steam. As the Cold War got underway, they were happy to abdicate their power in favor of the U.S. They had been unsuccessful in rebuilding a stable European order, and it was clear that Europeans were more willing to accept the external authority of Washington than of a near neighbor like Germany or France. The U.S. offered a controlled political decay while avoiding the loss of material prosperity.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As U.S. hegemony in Europe continued through the decades, the amount of people who can even remember a different state of affairs has grown increasingly small. In Kalergi’s lifetime, the rising generation of thinkers had been educated under still-dominant European cultures and thus could think from a European position. Today any American blockbuster, political commentary, or bestseller has had a much more direct influence on the average European than all the great literature of European nations combined. There is no longer a European intellectual sphere, but a Western one with its center in America.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">By the 1950s, Kalergi had become wise as to what the growing power of America meant for European sovereignty. In the aftermath of the Great War, he had sought to prevent a single country from gaining hegemony in Europe and forcing the rest of the continent back into disunity. In a sense, he had succeeded—hegemony from across the ocean now maintained the peace. Monnet’s vision of piecemeal integration could win out because this was the scope of questions that most of Western Europe were now confined to addressing. Barring defection to a Soviet alliance, it had settled on the system of liberal-democratic capitalism. Military questions were mostly beyond its scope; Europe instead saw the rise of an aristocracy of entitlement.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Kalergi’s enemies perhaps rightly saw him as a threat to national interests. But in his opposition to chauvinistic nationalism, Kalergi had overlooked the geopolitical reality that political order relies on a powerful state to undergird it, not a coalition. Europe’s Cold War alignment was defined by conquest, not diplomacy. He had romanticized the possibility of a European great man, but could never have gotten the one he wanted. It remains an open question whether any European great power might have been able to bring about European unity if things had gone differently. What if De Gaulle had won over more allies to his cause? What if the Central Powers had dominated Europe after a Great War victory? What if political coalitions in inter-war Germany had gone a different way? Europe needed a large, rich, and secure power to conquer it and guarantee peace. It was obtained in the end, but not from Europe. The lynchpin of the postwar order was the economic, military, and political power of the U.S.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">De Gaulle would remain among the last defenders of a sovereign Europe, unable to accept that the moment of his country had passed. With the death of De Gaulle, Kalergi lost his last great backer. Like Europe itself, Kalergi was still dignified, but would never be close to power again. In post-war Europe, there was no trace of Kalergi’s “aristocracy of the spirit.” The age of the technocrats had begun.</span></p>
<div class="author-bio">
<p class="author-description">Miquel Vila is the executive director of the Catalonia Global Institute. His research focuses on the geopolitics and geoeconomics of East Asia and on nationalist movements. He tweets <a href="https://twitter.com/MiquelVilam">@MiquelVilam</a>.</p>
</div>The post <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2022/11/09/the-mirage-of-european-sovereignty/">The Mirage of European Sovereignty
</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/">Palladium</a>.]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">5811</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>Why Catalonia Failed
</title>
		<link>https://www.palladiummag.com/2022/05/11/why-catalonia-failed/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Miquel Vila]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 May 2022 18:58:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://palladiummag.com/?p=5085</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Catalonia's nationalist politicians made their careers on symbolic separatism. In 2017, a successful referendum for independence called their bluff.</p>
The post <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2022/05/11/why-catalonia-failed/">Why Catalonia Failed
</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/">Palladium</a>.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On October 10th, 2017, hundreds of people gathered outside the parliament of Catalonia in Barcelona. With bated breath, they watched a large TV live-streaming Catalan President Carles Puigdemont as he approached the speaker’s podium inside. The region had just completed a historic referendum to decide its independence from Spain. After a brief speech, he made the declaration that Catalan nationalists had been dreaming about for generations: “I assume the mandate of the people for Catalonia to become an independent state in the shape of a republic.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The crowd erupted into celebration—the dawn of Catalan independence was here. I was there in the crowd that night, singing songs of freedom with strangers who had become my comrades. It didn’t feel like the end of a referendum, but a national beginning after which there was no turning back.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Then, exactly eight seconds later, it was over. It wasn’t because the Spanish police had stormed the Catalan Parliament, as they had with the voting stations. Nor did the army suddenly appear on the streets of Barcelona. Instead, Puigdemont himself announced to the cheering crowd that his government was “[asking] Parliament to suspend the effects of the declaration of independence so that in the coming weeks we can undertake dialogue” with Spain. He also pledged to search for international mediation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Instantly, disbelief and utter confusion engulfed the crowd. The moment&#8217;s frustration was immortalized in a </span><a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/75jbf7/catalonia_declaration_of_independence_in_two/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">popular meme</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Puigdemont’s time as a Catalan national hero had lasted only moments. Now, the cheers were replaced by boos, jeers, and curses.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Two weeks later, the Catalan parliament declared independence again. But by then, it had no meaning. The declaration wasn’t recognized by any sovereign state, including Spain. But in the streets and cafes of Barcelona as well as on Twitter, people directed their ire toward the very first political authority to not recognize the Catalan Republic: the pro-independence government itself. Catalonia’s dream to become a sovereign country in 2017 was over.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It wasn’t the first time. The mythos of Catalan nationalism is built around inspiring losses. Catalonia’s national day and its national anthem both commemorate moments in which Catalans took a stand against Spain. This time, independence supporters felt they were not even given a chance to fight. At the moment when all the stars seemed to align, the movement’s leaders had no plan.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Now, years later, the decision has spawned multiple theories about the independence movement’s leaders. The typical belief of many independence supporters is that the Catalan political elites never intended to achieve independence at all—the whole thing was just a career-making scheme. But this alone doesn’t give us a complete picture. Although half-hearted, the government had still organized a self-determination referendum and declared independence.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">What they didn’t foresee was the outcome, or the extent to which Spain was willing to go to prevent it. Catalan elites, unaccustomed to the affairs of statehood, approached secession like an administrative measure or a policy decision—like business as usual. But Spanish elites, knowing what it takes to rule a state, took a much more serious approach to the matter. They were willing to suspend political and legal norms to stop Catalonia’s independence and prevent the breakup of Spain. In the face of the Spanish response, the Catalan government fell apart at the very moment when they seemed victorious.</span></p>
<h3>Catalonia&#8217;s Political Fictions</h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Since 2012, the Catalan independence movement had progressively gained momentum. The movement had a grassroots character to its support, mobilizing millions of Catalans every year to demand a referendum on self-determination.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">And every year, the government in Madrid held the line: there would be no referendum or negotiation on Spanish territorial integrity. Catalonia already enjoyed a settlement of limited autonomous regional powers, and that was as far as Madrid was willing to go.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Despite Spain’s opposition, the movement kept growing, especially among younger, educated residents of cities like Barcelona. As a response to this growing support, Catalonia’s government decided to unilaterally organize an independence referendum on October 1st, 2017. President Carles Puigdemont, then-leader of the Catalan European Democratic Party, was presiding over a coalition government. His vice-president was Oriol Junqueras, leader of the pro-independence Republican Left of Catalonia. Along with other officials, politicians, and leaders of prominent activist groups and NGOs, they were broadly recognized as the de-facto “General Staff” in charge of guiding the actions of the pro-independence movement.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Catalan leadership crafted its strategy around the belief that in a liberal democratic regime, the democratic will of the citizens is the deciding factor in any political dispute, and that other dimensions of power are secondary. Catalonia’s leadership believed that if they could electorally show that a significant bulk of the Catalan population wanted independence from Spain, that would be enough to surpass any Spanish opposition. That would give Catalan authorities bargaining power vis-à-vis Madrid and perhaps even force the external diplomatic intervention of the “international community.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Catalan government, as well as the broader independence movement, attributed inherent power to the performative action of casting a ballot. The vote in the referendum was seen as the culminating point of the struggle, not its beginning. Catalan leaders invoked the precedents of the self-determination referendums of Quebec in 1995 and Scotland in 2014—neither of which ended in secession. The government itself seemed to view the foundation of a new Catalan state as a mere administrative question, not a moment of sovereign exception against the Spanish state. Nonetheless, even before October 1st, it was clear that Catalan independence wouldn’t be a costless transition.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The referendum was clearly outside the Spanish constitutional order. From a pro-independence standpoint, that made perfect sense. The declaration of October 1st would have been Catalonia’s first act of sovereignty, its foundational moment.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, that was already beyond the limits of the Catalan government’s worldview.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In Madrid, a different worldview prevailed. The prime minister of Spain, Mariano Rajoy, with the cooperation of all the major Spanish political parties, opted to put Catalonia under a non-declared state of exception during the autumn of 2017. Police raided newspapers, post offices, and the Catalan ministerial headquarters. Websites linked to the referendum were censored.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On October 1st, despite crackdowns by the police on voting stations where around a thousand Catalan voters were injured, the referendum was completed with relative success. The turnout was lower than the independence movement had hoped for: about 43%, mostly supporters of independence. In total, just over 2 million Catalans voted for secession, out of </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Catalan_independence_referendum#Overall"><span style="font-weight: 400;">5.3 million</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> eligible voters. The government estimated that </span><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20171006212613/http://www.govern.cat/pres_gov/govern/ca/monografics/303541/govern-trasllada-resultats-definitius-referendum-l1-doctubre-parlament-catalunya.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">up to </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">700,000</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> votes were not cast due to police raids causing shutdowns of voting stations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It had been neither the best environment nor the best numbers to decide Catalonia’s future. But given the circumstances, it showed a strong base of support. It was the only kind of referendum Catalonia could realistically have.</span></p>
<h3>The Moment of Truth</h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to the laws approved by the Catalan parliament, the result of the referendum was supposed to be implemented two days after the vote, on October 3rd. That day, the pro-independence movement organized the largest general strike in Catalonia’s—and Spain&#8217;s—history. The shock caused by the images of the crackdown of the referendum gave the independence movement the moral high ground. Even within the pro-Spanish camp, many considered Madrid to have gone too far.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The pro-independence supporters were marching in the streets of Barcelona and in every major city in Catalonia. If there was ever a moment for the pro-independence government to act, this was it.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Nothing happened. No one declared independence on October 3rd. Catalonia&#8217;s leaders hesitated at the very brink of their defining moment.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But Spanish authorities did not. On the evening of that same day, King Philip VI of Spain made his own speech on events in Catalonia. He accused the Catalan government of “disloyalty to the state” for positioning itself outside the law. He asked the “powers of the state” to reimpose the constitutional order in Catalonia. Puigdemont had remained silent since the day of the referendum, but he reappeared to reply to the king. The speech of King Philip had inflamed independence supporters, who were more ready than ever for action. They expected an equally strong response from their own leaders.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Instead, Puigdemont expressed his disappointment with the lack of empathy by the king of the country he was trying to break away from. The Catalan government, he said, expected the king to play a mediating role—as if the monarch, as head of the Spanish state, wasn’t an interested party.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Puigdemont’s response was a prelude to the fateful speech he would go on to make on October 10th. It was not the answer of a sovereign entity to another sovereign. Catalan authorities were still acting as if they were playing within the ordinary frameworks of the Spanish system, in which, the monarch is supposed to play the role of a neutral arbiter.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But the role of the monarchy is inseparable from Spanish unity. The figure of the king is one of the unifying elements of both Spanish elites and Spanish nationalism. Among intellectual, political, and business elites, green ties have become a </span><a href="https://www.20minutos.es/noticia/4344278/0/que-significa-acronimo-verde-apoyo-monarquia-espanola/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">mark of support</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> for the monarchy and the idea of a united Spain it represents. This is because </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">verde </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">stands in royalist circles for V.E.R.D.E: </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Viva el Rey de España—</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Long Live the King of Spain.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">King Philip always knew his role in this crisis. After the referendum, the monarch personally contacted top Catalan business executives to ask them to support Spain and move their companies out of Catalonia. Many followed his advice, including Catalonia&#8217;s two most prominent financial institutions: Banc Sabadell and CaixaBank.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Years later, the contrast between Puigdemont and King Philip’s speeches remains the most illustrative example of how the Catalan and Spanish elites understood the situation. Legally, Catalan politicians knew they had gone beyond Spain’s constitutional order. However, in practical terms, they expected to keep playing within the rules of Spanish governance. That was something that Madrid could not accept. At that moment, the events in Catalonia were way beyond the ordered procedures of institutional liberalism and had entered the realm of sovereign state power. That was unknown territory for Catalonia’s “General Staff.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Despite the political situation, pro-independence activists were still confident in their leadership. Then came the fateful eight seconds of Catalonia’s independence on October 10th. After it was evident that the Catalan government wanted to back down, that confidence collapsed.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The results of the referendum had forced the Catalan government to cross the line from symbolic politics to real questions of sovereign power. Vice President Oriol Junqueras told voters they had “plans A, B, and C.” But they weren’t ready to pursue a rupture without Spain’s agreement, nor did they have the will to keep fighting. Most likely, it was never even an option. The movement simply was not built for action beyond electoral politics within the Spanish system.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Once Spain began to prepare its reaction, the pro-independence camp lost its momentum. For the governing coalition in Catalonia, the question was no longer how to lead the struggle against Spain, but who would pay the cost of letting down the independence movement in the next elections.</span></p>
<h3>Catalonia&#8217;s Fragile Autonomy</h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Puigdemont did not want to get caught in this trap by his coalition partners and reiterated Catalonia’s declaration of independence on October 27th. But he gave no directions for how to proceed and didn’t ask for any civil disobedience or street action.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The government itself scattered. Puigdemont and half of the Catalan ministers went into exile in Brussels. Oriol Junqueras and the others surrendered themselves to the Spanish government and were held in prison until their pardon in June 2021.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the immediate aftermath, Spain took direct control of Catalonia’s government. There were no calls to resist from the Catalan authorities. Some pro-independence officials lost their jobs, but many high-ranking figures of the previous pro-independence government kept their positions and actively collaborated with Madrid. Pere Aragonès, a pro-independence politician who is now the president of Catalonia, spent this period as its vice-president and Minister of Economy and Finance.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Catalan nationalism had worked to give a mirage of statehood to their autonomous institutions for the forty years leading up to the referendum. That helped reinforce Catalonia’s identity and smoothen possible frictions with Spain. But autonomy also allowed for the emergence of a new elite linked to the power of the regional administration. They could participate in a mirage of state power while not participating in any of its most sensitive elements. They could receive the treatment of state elites—complete with political offices like the Catalan Foreign Minister–without having to hold their responsibilities.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Current Catalan political elites developed their careers in this environment, emerging from sectors linked to political activism, tourism, and administration. Puigdemont himself began his career as a journalist before becoming the mayor of Girona and eventually the president of Catalonia. In many ways his success was accidental. He became the president of Catalonia because his predecessor was mistrusted and disliked by the pro-independence left, while Puigdemont was unknown enough to generate consensus. Oriol Junqueras was a college history professor before becoming a politician. Carme Forcadell, former President of the Parliament of Catalonia, led the prominent pro-independence activist organization Catalan National Assembly.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The influence of the “General Staff” was primarily dependent on their positions in the autonomous region’s administrative bodies. Once Madrid took control of Catalonia’s government, the fragility of their position became evident. The primary source of their power was borrowed from the very Spanish state they were trying to break away from.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">They had no backup, having not bothered to cultivate more independent sources of power outside the regional institutions. While Catalonia has its own police force, most of its members are pro-Spanish. Its major companies rely on Spain for the international ties they benefit from. The judiciary, likewise, remained intertwined with the Spanish legal system and had no particular loyalty towards the independence cause. Catalan elites had simply never foreseen a scenario in which the loyalty of the security forces, corporate sector, and state administration could be crucial for achieving their goals.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Instead, both the government and the independence movement viewed these hard dimensions of power </span><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/09/20/catalonia-dreams-of-a-european-future-as-other-nations-try-to-turn-back-the-clock/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">as obsolete</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Ideologically, the Catalan leadership was informed by European civic liberalism as a strategy for creating a state, not just governing one. They could not fathom the use of force on a large scale against a political movement that portrayed itself as peaceful and democratic. Even if Spain took extra-legal measures, they believed that the international community would step up for them because Catalan independence was a democratic cause. After all, a democratic state member of the European Union would need to </span><a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/president-of-catalonia-vows-to-go-ahead-with-independence-vote-referendum-spain/?utm_content=bufferad02a&amp;utm_medium=social&amp;utm_source=twitter.com&amp;utm_campaign=buffer"><span style="font-weight: 400;">restrain itself</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to remain in good standing.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the end, their naive idealism ran up against political reality when even EU institutions supported Spain’s actions to preserve its territorial integrity. With real state interests on the line, only local activists and Catalan politicians carefully insulated from sovereign politics believed in liberal democracy as a practical path to challenging Spanish sovereignty.</span></p>
<h3>State Power and Spanish Elites</h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On the other side, Spain’s elites were much more familiar with the political terrain that Catalonia was treading. The process of the centralization of power in Madrid began centuries ago. However, the current structure of Spanish elites was consolidated during the second half of the twentieth century. The governing class in Spain had survived through Europe’s revolutionary era, the two World Wars, and the Cold War.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Most importantly, they won a bloody civil war. Franco’s Spain consolidated a unified and centralized modern state elite around the army, the judiciary, and the top bureaucracy based in Madrid. These institutions are intimately linked to Spanish sovereignty and were constructed specifically to overcome internal opposition to the state. It is not surprising that Madrid grasped the gravity of what the attempted secession of Catalonia implied for them in a way that pro-independence elites never dared to acknowledge openly.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the Spanish governing class, the link between legislative and judiciary power is especially common. Mariano Rajoy, prime minister of Spain during the Catalan referendum, embodies the history of Spain’s political elites. He came from a family of regional magistrates and jurists from Galicia, then became the right-hand man of Jose Manuel Fraga, founder of Spain’s People’s Party and a former Franco-era minister. His chief of staff, Soraya Saenz de Santamaria, eventually went on to take control of Catalonia’s autonomous government in 2018.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The cabinet of Pedro Sanchez&#8217;s current socialist government includes four former magistrates. Two of them—Defense Minister Margarita Robles and Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska—were involved in the Basque region when the armed separatist organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna was active.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In contrast to Catalonia’s administrators, Spanish national elites tend to have far more experience working with the coercive dimension of the state. Catalonia’s politicians saw independence in terms of freedom in government, public policy, and budgetary issues. Spain’s elites saw it as an existential threat. The real question at stake was the overall legal and political order ruling Catalan territory. Only the Spanish side was willing to force a state of exception to the constitutional order to answer it.</span></p>
<h3>Performative Action Turns Real</h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A </span><a href="https://www.vilaweb.cat/noticies/clara-ponsati-un-dels-problemes-que-te-especialment-la-politica-es-que-es-treballa-molt-poc/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">popular hypothesis</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> among independence supporters is that pro-independence elites understood the October 1st referendum as a performative act that would give them bargaining power vis-à-vis Madrid. That seems backed up by the defense strategy that imprisoned pro-independence leaders used in their trial. According to this explanation, they were not ready to achieve Catalonia’s secession because they did not aim for it in the first place.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But even in this scenario, the Catalan leadership could never have avoided the question of sovereignty. If they had backed down before the referendum, that would have made much more sense—and in fact, there were some attempts to do so.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But once the Rubicon was crossed, they had gone beyond the normal game of Spanish internal politics. The non-sanctioned referendum by itself, whatever the result, was an open challenge to Spain’s sovereignty over Catalonia. King Philip chose his words carefully when he reminded the Catalan government that the regional institutions of Catalonia were part of the administration of Spain. As he correctly expressed, Madrid had no option but to “take them back under the legality” of the state if it was to maintain sovereignty over all of Spain.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The problem for the pro-independence leadership was that, regardless of whether they wanted to remain in the symbolic terrain, their actions had meaning in real life. For a nation-state, especially one with weak internal cohesion, such an open challenge to its sovereignty is a serious threat to its existence and cannot be left unchallenged. If Spain had accepted the negotiation, it would have generated a dangerous precedent. Catalan independence could only ever be unilateral. That meant that a Catalan Republic would have to take actual control of the region and state institutions via the security forces, which would have to be convinced to defect from the national government. Catalan leaders were not just unwilling to do this—they never even seemed to contemplate it.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Critics from within the movement have argued that the government should have sanctioned mass civil disobedience as a way to impose costs on Spanish intervention. But two elements likely made this an unacceptable move for Catalan politicians.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The first is that Catalan nationalist elites remained wary of any alternative power source emerging from civil society. Even though they embraced independence once popular support emerged, part of their tacit agreement with Spain has always been to control the secessionist temptations of Catalan society. This was the very logic under which Catalonia gained its original autonomous status.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The second is that pursuing the path for independence and rupture from Spain would have meant acting as true state-founders. As the answer of Puigdemont to Philip VI showed, they did not have the mindset to assume responsibility for the fate of the country. Appeasing Spain seemed more realistic because no other option existed in their models of political action—and so there was no other outcome they could prepare for.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the end, it seems that Spain took the Catalan authorities more seriously than they ever took themselves.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The grassroots independence movement itself, in contrast, went in a different direction. When </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/18/new-generation-new-tactics-the-changing-face-of-catalan-protests"><span style="font-weight: 400;">new protests arose in 2019</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, pro-independence protestors were capable of challenging Spain’s sovereignty in Catalonia, blocking the border with France, occupying Barcelona’s airport, and confronting the Spanish police in the streets of their capital. The movement&#8217;s demands then were centered around the amnesty of imprisoned Catalan pro-independence leaders, whom Spain would later pardon.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Spanish authorities have recognized the continuing threat to state sovereignty. They have </span><a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/04/25/how-democracies-spy-on-their-citizens"><span style="font-weight: 400;">closely monitored</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the pro-independence movement and Catalan politicians since 2017. The events following the referendum left a scar on the activists and sympathizers of independence. Sympathy for civil disobedience like that seen in 2019 </span><a href="https://cataloniaglobal.cat/en/the-catalan-rebels-in-waiting-a-new-survey-on-catalonias-independence-and-civil-disobedience/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">continues to rise</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. While Madrid has disciplined Catalonia’s politicians, the new generation of movement leaders is growing up with more radical, confrontational tactics and less faith in the electoral process.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But radicalization is not the same as a viable path to statehood. Though the Catalan conflict remains open for now, it’s a conflict in which both sides are operating on Spanish institutional terrain—one in which Madrid holds all the cards.</span></p>
<div class="author-bio">
<p class="author-description">Miquel Vila is the executive director of the Catalonia Global Institute. His research focuses on the geopolitics and geoeconomics of East Asia and on nationalist movements. He tweets <a href="https://twitter.com/MiquelVilam">@MiquelVilam</a>.</p>
</div>The post <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2022/05/11/why-catalonia-failed/">Why Catalonia Failed
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