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	<title>Seth Largo, Author at Palladium</title>
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		<title>The Answer Is Better Gangs
</title>
		<link>https://www.palladiummag.com/2023/06/22/the-answer-is-better-gangs/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Seth Largo]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Jun 2023 21:38:35 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.palladiummag.com/?p=6537</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As long as criminal enterprises offer the best gangs around, kids will continue to enter them. The question is where the better gangs could be.</p>
The post <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2023/06/22/the-answer-is-better-gangs/">The Answer Is Better Gangs
</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/">Palladium</a>.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Daniel Aguilar, 23, had been Christopher Ash’s friend before leading him into an ambush in Carson, a neighborhood in Los Angeles’s South Bay. Aguilar was sure that Ash had been talking to the cops about the then-recent murder of Cheryl Green, a 14-year-old black girl gunned down in 2006. She had been killed just a few miles away while skateboarding with friends. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Aguilar was friends with Ash, but he was also friends with Cheryl Green’s killer: 22-year-old Jonathan Fajardo. They were both members of the 204th Street gang, one of multiple L.A. street gangs that had been told by the Mexican Mafia that black Angelenos </span><a href="https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2007/latino-gang-members-southern-california-are-terrorizing-and-killing-blacks"><span style="font-weight: 400;">needed to go</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Racial violence was a fact of life among prison gangs like the Mexican Mafia, and their command was why Fajardo had fired at Cheryl Green and her friends. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">After luring Ash to the right spot, Fajardo, Aguilar, and several other members of the 204th Street gang </span><a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-sep-10-la-me-0910-harbor-gateway-20100910-story.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">stabbed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> him dozens of times for being a snitch. The later trials showed that their suspicions were </span><a href="https://www.dailybreeze.com/2011/12/12/gang-member-gets-15-years-to-life-for-role-in-ash-killing/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">wrong</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> all along. But this was L.A. in the 2000s, and such a death was a real risk for a kid in the wrong circles. Ash, Aguilar, Fajardo, and the rest had probably been in the wrong circles since their playground days.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">What do you do with a population of young men versed in both loyalty and violence? The difficulty of finding a path into civic life affects all races and classes. Anyone who fails to thrive in the classroom doesn’t have much room to assimilate into a respectable part of society. Among America’s poorer and lower-middle-class communities, however, a tempting alternative is sometimes available. Shadow industries like drug trafficking are thriving in America, and the powerful and organized networks of gangs that service them have plentiful recruits.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The military was once the preferred method of transforming wayward adolescents into good Americans with civic potential. Churches, shop floors, and private societies played similar roles. Those old paths and that old machinery have either disappeared, stopped assimilating their members, or otherwise failed to attract young men. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The gang hierarchies that have emerged since then are responsible for many of the smash-and-grab robberies, carjackings, and shootouts in U.S. cities. Today, home-grown groups affiliated with criminal organizations in Latin America are the big players in the landscape, having pushed out earlier rivals like the Crips and Bloods. The Latino population is growing through continuous immigration, and the archetypal recruit is a second-generation kid with some ties back home. The criminal enterprises are worth billions of dollars, routed internationally. The Italian mob lasted for several decades at its height, but the Latino groups are already pushing that and seem set to surpass them in longevity.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">What is also different about organized crime now is that social media has made its specter more alarming. Viral videos frighten people more than headlines about homicide rates do. The recall of San Francisco District Attorney Chesa Boudin indicates that even residents of liberal cities are second-guessing their soft-on-crime proclivities. The circa </span><a href="https://apnews.com/article/crime-nayib-bukele-organized-san-salvador-human-rights-72e1b8f58bddbc2098d9b940fb2049ca"><span style="font-weight: 400;">90 percent</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> approval rating of El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele, meanwhile, demonstrates that anyone who solves the crime problem can claim political legitimacy as a reward. His popularity in some U.S. circles exists on that same basis: given the current lack of home-grown crimefighters, some Americans are vicariously embracing those abroad. Those still unconcerned with crime assume that our institutions are just too strong—street violence is one thing, but what happened in Colombia and Mexico surely can’t happen here. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yet, overdose deaths have </span><a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/drug-overdose-data.htm"><span style="font-weight: 400;">climbed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> from under 20,000 annually in the late 1990s to over 100,000 as of 2021. The rise in customers implies a growing logistics network operating within and across U.S. borders. If the network wants to keep growing, gangs and cartels must do what all companies must do: recruit and foster talent. Half-hearted attempts to reach America’s lost boys through education, community centers, or antipoverty initiatives will not stem this flow. Pulling kids from gangland into baseline American society requires that there are attainable places for them that service not only their material needs, but also their desire for respect, loyalty, and glory. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The main ladder to money and prestige in the U.S. runs through a set of schools and professional service industries that are already constrained by global competition for spots. These spots are largely out of the reach of your average kid from a poor family in a metro area suburb, barring the few that can muster the scholarships. More importantly, that path just isn&#8217;t as cool and won’t win you any clout with your closest friends.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">When I spoke to those who had lived the gang lifestyle about their motivations, it was exactly that desire for personal clout, loyalty, and ambition that motivated the kids to become criminal soldiers. It is an ethos that does not absorb well into the professionalized environments of “good schools” and service economies. As long as criminal enterprises are the best gangs around, kids will continue to join them. In that case, the right question to ask is where the better gangs could be.</span></p>
<h3><b>Jumped In</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The story of Aguilar, Fajardo, and the rest ended with convictions at varying levels for the murders. But they had all first learned the readiness to commit violence many years earlier, at the moment they were “jumped in” to their local neighborhood gang of kids. It usually happens in a neighborhood alley or an elementary schoolyard, and it happens when a person is very young. It is a simple process of your friends beating you up and seeing if you can take it.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">I was in fifth grade when I got jumped in. Like most public schools in the L.A. metro region, mine was part white and part Hispanic. My friends were trying to see “if the white boy can hang,” but I ran like hell after a couple of kicks. We all remained friends afterward because not all of us took it seriously. For me, getting jumped in was a joke. But a few of those old pals—the ones who suggested the idea in the first place—took it more seriously.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Some of the Hispanic kids had older brothers or cousins running in gangs, too. The word “gang” frightened and excited the white and middle-class Mexican-American kids. We didn’t know what it meant. That kind of gang was different from a gang of friends, which all of us had. It was not uncommon to find a group of 10-year-old boys taking turns getting pummeled in the center of a melee of limbs. We didn’t know it, but the divergence in our life paths was also beginning there.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">I had these memories at the back of my mind as I talked to “Billy,” a former <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sure%C3%B1os">Sureño</a>. The gangs that use that name pay tribute to the Mexican Mafia, the same prison-based organization that instigated the racial killings of the 2000s. Billy says that gang life starts with groups of friends formed in late elementary school, junior high, and early high school. Eventually, by the time you cook up a name for yourselves, there is a potent loyalty between everybody. For most of us who grow up and drift away in later adolescence, that kind of bond is a fleeting one that lasts a few years at most. But during those youthful flashes, you are inseparable. Gang life seizes on this devotion, and it is so fundamental to growing up that policies and policing can never squash it. By 18, says Billy, young men growing up in barrios beset by gangs and their ethos have been claimed for good. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">National and regional politicians often misunderstand what drives young men and women into gang life in the first place because they underestimate how young it all starts. Military recruiters visiting elementary schools would scandalize many people, but by that age gangs are already getting to kids and offering them a vision of pride, loyalty, and excitement.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">When schoolyard gangs form among the younger kids, the older ones that are plugged into more organized gang life take notice. They infiltrate these youthful bonds to foster talent and figure out who can be valuable for what. The only thing stronger than friendship at age 12 is recognition from 16-year-olds. “You guys can hang with us” is a powerful motivator. By the time those kids turn into teens and then into young adults, they have been in the crew for half their life. There is little else to counterbalance these ties, especially when most of the kids have divorced parents or an absent father. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Billy recounts to me that three castes emerge during these initial stages of gang life: entrepreneurial leaders, killers, and followers. The kids that have an extra chip on their shoulders are the ones who learn to be leaders. Those who become killers understand little about their organization other than that loyalty and aggressive behavior are rewarded. Fajardo, the gangster who shot Cheryl Green, was a killer. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The other young Latinos involved in Cheryl’s shooting and in Christopher Ash’s ambush were followers. In all likelihood, no amount of dope or alcohol would have stopped their hands from shaking as they rushed Ash. Yet, here is where the early ritual of getting jumped into a gang leads: youthful bonds are cultivated to eventually produce young men who can become soldiers. The ability of those kids to say no to Fajardo, and to whatever big homie gave Fajardo his shooting orders, probably went by the wayside in ninth grade—maybe in sixth.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Most kids, Billy tells me, have no idea what sort of international network they are plugging into when they form or join a street gang of friends to watch each other’s backs. Anyone who has grown up in the barrio or the hood understands that kids feel vulnerable to menacing forces at an early age; Billy and his friends formed their clique as a response to kids from blocks away always looking for a fight. A “protection racket” is a type of gang activity, but &#8220;protection&#8221; is also a useful term for understanding the street-level reality of what gangs are for even their own members. The result is that boys hardly old enough to shave are continuously recruited into a corporate, criminal structure they know nothing about. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Looking at a list of cliques, gangs, cartels, and their links can be a dizzying experience, like disentangling the terrorist networks of the 2000s. The 18th Street gang, White Fence, and the 204th Street gang are all at war for turf on the streets of Los Angeles. But behind bars, they are all Sureños—“Southlanders”—pledging allegiance to the Mexican Mafia. Some gangs are united on the street in theory because the same cartel supplies their narcotics, and their profits funnel upward to that cartel. In practice, they will often end up shooting at each other. Sometimes, gangs are supplied by different cartels, but these adversaries on the streets will chill together behind bars, united against the greater threats of the black and white prison gangs. No 12-year-old that gets jumped into a street gang understands any of this. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, the edifice makes more sense if you compare the cliques, gangs, and cartels to another landscape of American drug distribution: alcohol sales. The “brands” in the liquor aisle—Budweiser, Busch Light, or Modelo—are like the bewildering array of gangs and cliques. Like alcohol brands, certain gangs dominate a large geographical and economic territory, while others are local. Everyone knows Bud Lite and MS-13, but not everyone knows Ballast Point Brewery or the 204th Street gang. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, no matter how large or powerful, gangs and brands are just the public endpoints of a network of production, distribution, and corporate ownership. It takes a powerful, centralized organization to coordinate all the materials and personnel required to get a case of brand-name beer or a dime bag of coke to the customer. The gangs are just the brands in that larger game, and behind them lie the comparatively few centralized cartels that coordinate the supply chain. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A large enough gang’s power can seem to rival that of the cartels. MS-13, due to its size and international scope, is better known than the Gulf Cartel. In contrast, the power of lesser gangs like White Fence in Los Angeles’s Boyle Heights neighborhood may only stretch across three square miles of urban turf. But in both cases, the gang’s power begins with retail and ends with wholesale distribution. Gangs who try to source and control their own narcotics supply and logistical network are acting like cartels, which can land them in very hot water. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The analogy is not perfect. The Mexican Mafia’s prison-based structure does not overlap with the cartels, so their realms of power do not conflict very often. InBev or Constellation also rely on sales and investments for cash flow, while gangs and cartels can pad drug sales with kidnapping, extortion, grand theft, and bank fraud.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">These complex structures of farms, labs, pilots, drivers, storage units, and weaponry allocation access a U.S. customer base worth around </span><a href="https://www.rand.org/news/press/2019/08/20.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">$150 billion</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> per year. The local crews of boys are the last mile deliverers, the FedEx drivers of the game, with shift managers like Jonathan Fajardo to keep them in line. As long as this industry remains more attractive than schoolwork to the boys it recruits, it will continue to thrive. In that case, the question is where such boys can be initiated into something better and more useful. The real problem is that baseline American society neither desires nor, increasingly, permits any healthy form of the gang-like social fabric to occur within its ranks at all.</span></p>
<h3><b>The Social Form of the Gang</b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">During our conversation, Billy admitted to me that he “liked the violence, the fighting,” and that was part of the Sureño gang’s appeal. Few politicians say it out loud, but most societies have roles for young men like him, and America is no exception. But these boys need very different structures from those that professional-track institutions tend to prioritize. These look like small groups with tight, personal loyalties; room for conflicts that establish internal hierarchies; encouragement of instincts like physical courage and aggression; a group spirit that you orient your whole life around; and hierarchy based on personal charisma and not just formal officialdom. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Criminal gangs are not the only sorts of organizations that achieve this. There is a reason that Latin America is rife with ideological paramilitaries, cell-structure martial arts dojos, and, more recently, cells of Evangelical churches that dot poor neighborhoods. Similar institutions, barring the paramilitaries, dot poor Hispanic neighborhoods in the U.S. They draw on the gangs themselves for recruitment, with current and former members often finding them to be natural environments to fall into. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In particular, the churches tend to become a landing place for those wanting to leave the lifestyle, using regimens like </span><a href="https://apnews.com/article/el-salvador-gangs-pastors-evangelicals-14609d2ab31e299c5ada0661694acd88"><span style="font-weight: 400;">5 a.m. wake-ups, Bible-reading, and labor</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to provide structure and discipline. These communities can replace criminal gangs because they mimic so many of their features. As a result, gangs will often </span><a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/07/02/624231578/for-some-gang-members-in-el-salvador-the-evangelical-church-offers-a-way-out"><span style="font-weight: 400;">spare</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> them from conflicts or even extend a sort of protection. If you want to govern men like Billy or Fajardo, you must have fluency in the structures they themselves exist in. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This requires reaching these children with a better alternative before the gangs do. Criminal industries sustain themselves from the bottom up, and the cornerstones of every power structure are the foot soldiers. Remove those stones and the whole thing topples over. If the U.S. learned anything from the War on Terror, it is that targeting the hydra’s heads is counterproductive. Remove one, and two grow back. El Chapo goes to jail, but the Chapos-in-waiting fight until new leaders emerge, and that infighting spills out into the streets and claims civilian lives. Locking up the big homies doesn’t work because it just creates a leadership void in a profitable and healthy corporate structure. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The tail of the hydra is the other potential target: the foot soldiers, the boys on the corner who, if not thrown into jail, might be caught early enough and guided into a legitimate pathway toward adulthood. This extended tail is larger and more unwieldy than the individual heads, but it is collectively far more vulnerable. 12-year-olds remain 12-year-olds, whatever neighborhood they are in. The problem is that no agency or institution in the U.S. has pursued this strategy with force and urgency.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In El Salvador, President Nayib Bukele carried out his own version of this strategy: he rounded up every kid with a hint of gang affiliation, including tattoos. In so doing, he got rid of the street-level cliques on whom the cartels rely for the “last mile” of retail distribution. Bukele did not wait for murder indictments to appear on their records. He swept them up before the fact. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">What makes Bukele’s policy noteworthy is that, despite its use of legal and judicial structures, it is also an application of gang logic at the political level. In terms of Western legal norms, lawbreaking is a defined action that activates a judicial response. Bukele instead identified a whole population as an enemy of the state and updated the legal and judicial structures to take them off the streets. In terms of academic political theory, this is a classic “friend-enemy” distinction. In El Salvador, it’s a lot more simple: the state is now the biggest gang in town, and messing with it puts you in a cell. That is not just a slogan for posing tough, but an actual political consciousness and mode of exercising power. It exists in tension with aspects of the liberal political ontology, like human rights and due process, but gets along much more comfortably with other aspects, like sovereignty and monopoly on force. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is not a level of gang logic that current U.S. leaders are interested in employing against organized crime, least of all against the footsoldiers. It is a nuclear launch button that no American leader will press, no matter the number of bystanders who get shot in Chicago, L.A., or U.S. border towns. Most Americans don’t want it pressed anyway, if they are being honest. Locking up tens of thousands of young men and women without due process starts a cascade that can lead to the Colombian and Mexican situations, where citizens are subject to legal friend-enemy lines that don’t line up with who actually feeds and protects them on the ground, or with their desire not to see siblings and cousins vanish from the dinner table.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But the social form of the gang is already spreading beyond its traditional bounds, cropping up closer to the frontlines of the violence. One of the best examples of this cascade is the existence of deputy gangs within the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD). </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to </span><a href="https://www.lamag.com/longform/downfall/3/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">testimony</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> given to the Citizens’ Commission on Jail Violence, an inmate at Men’s Central Jail (MCJ) heard one deputy say to another “Ready to earn your ink?” just before the inmate’s orbital socket was smashed in. The ink in question was a Roman numeral II, the tattoo for the 2000 Boys, a warden clique in the 2000 block of MCJ. In May 2023, the L.A. County Office of the Inspector General demanded the names of inked members of the most violent deputy gangs, the Banditos and the Executioners, who operate respectively out of the East L.A. and Compton stations. It requested interviews with at least 35 deputies, and local supervisors backed its intent to break the influence of the deputy gangs.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is not surprising that young deputies form ingroups within their shifts and stations. Gang dynamics among police units is an old story, from crooked cops during Prohibition to the Rampart scandal in the 1990s, which involved cross-contamination between street gangs and an elite deputy unit. The behaviors adopted by the newer deputy cliques clearly mimic the culture of a street gang. The tattoos and handshakes of gang life become a point of reference—an ethos and style acting as influences on the bonds created even within a strong institution like the LASD. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The reason this works is that the police fit many of the traits that young men like Billy thrived on in the criminal gangs themselves. Organized around clear battle lines, it is not surprising that some of the same dynamics would take over. And yet, if you want to alleviate crime and win authority or political power while doing it, turning young men’s desire for warrior loyalty around on the very gangs who would otherwise exploit it is a good strategy.</span></p>
<h3><b>A Better Kind of </b><b><i>Mara</i></b></h3>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Institutions with anti-gang recruitment mandates tend to resist “anger and all” approaches to reaching America’s lost boys. These larger organizations want to acculturate boys into an “educational attainment” vision whose appeal will always lose out to the life offered by the cool kids in the hood.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">El Salvador’s MS-13 gets its name from </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Mara Salvatrucha</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">. A </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">mara</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> is a gang in the same double sense as the English term: either a violent organization or a group of young friends. Every boy in the world has been part of a </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">mara</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in one form or another and understands those youthful loyalties. Only some are </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">salvatrucha</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">: street-smart and hungry in a way that middle-class friend groups will never understand. MS-13 and its rivals exist because they are the best </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">maras</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> around, and they will get displaced only when those who are </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">salvatrucha </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">have something better to be hazed into.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">There have been very occasional exceptions: in the 1970s, the L.A. suburb of Chino fought its local gang, the Chino Sinners, with a </span><a href="https://chinoboxingclub.com/clients/36032/File/History%20Of%20CBC.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">boxing club</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> instead. Gang roundups in the 1990s removed those in the lifestyle from the streets, but the club is recognized today as having played an important role in eliminating the influence of the Sinners among Chino’s young kids. There is a void waiting to be filled by anyone who knows that most 10-year-olds in the barrio will be more drawn to a boxing ring than a classroom. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is a void that cannot be filled by outsiders. If you have not been through hazings, risked life and limb for friends, and fought against others just because they are others, you have missed out on the whole category of life that defines the barrio kids’ existence. Now-mainline U.S. institutions like organized labor were originally constructed by rallying these same instincts in a population of working men familiar with them from childhood. The replacement of these generations with their professionalized offspring eventually coincided with the end of organized labor’s power, as the economic roles requiring such men and the older immigrant neighborhoods that formed them began to vanish. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The gang will abide because it works, and not just in its criminal incarnation. While the social damage done by the criminal element is high, extinguishing the last remnants of these instincts from an already over-professionalized U.S. population is a totally counterproductive goal. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As Latin American immigration continues and U.S. fertility remains highest at the population’s economic tail-ends, an increasingly large number of men with personal experience or adjacency to gang life will exist. Under pressure and social osmosis, police departments and other institutions in the large metropoles will likewise continue to adopt gang-like dynamics among themselves. The tensions between the frontlines and the more cushioned segments of professional society will only continue to grow. The legal-political structure can certainly crack down on and break up gangs when they become real threats to its stability, but high levels of street violence and rising urban homicides seem to be tolerable situations for it.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The advantage will go to those who have fluency in the gang social form. In the coming decades, it is likely that we will see the rise of significant power players that fit that description, especially in the local and state politics of regions like the Southwest. These, in turn, are bases of national power and influence. In that environment, you will not be able to play high-level politics without understanding how to command and compel the respect of men who might have—and perhaps once did—join the ranks of violent street gangs. Likewise, simply driving out groups like MS-13 will not solve the problems of criminal gangs. As long as kids bind together for protection and glory in their neighborhoods, the seeds of their successors will exist.</span></p>
<div class="author-bio">
<p class="author-description">Seth Largo holds degrees in linguistics and rhetoric. A native of Los Angeles’ suburban sprawl, he is now an English professor on the high plains.</p>
</div>The post <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2023/06/22/the-answer-is-better-gangs/">The Answer Is Better Gangs
</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/">Palladium</a>.]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">6537</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Green Zone Plan to Reopen Universities
</title>
		<link>https://www.palladiummag.com/2020/06/26/the-green-zone-plan-to-reopen-universities/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Seth Largo]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2020 17:01:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.palladiummag.com/?p=3346</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Universities face a moment of decision for the upcoming fall semester, but instead of embracing fully online content or just throwing the doors wide open, they can develop a serious Green Zone plan to effectively handle the COVID-19 crisis.</p>
The post <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2020/06/26/the-green-zone-plan-to-reopen-universities/">The Green Zone Plan to Reopen Universities
</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/">Palladium</a>.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At the end of 2019, I <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2019/12/13/the-university-system-isnt-going-anywhere/">argued</a> that the West’s higher education system will not sink into irrelevance amidst the torrent of digital competitors, whatever the techno-boosters say, because universities have survived wars and plagues that decimated entire economies. YouTube tutorials and Joe Rogan’s podcast are a bagatelle by comparison.</p>
<p>Now it’s 2020. War has yet to erupt, but nature has decided once again to challenge universities with a plague. Universities have survived plagues before, ones far worse than COVID-19. So, on the one hand, it’s reasonable to assume that universities will outlast the threat of the novel coronavirus; less a bagatelle than Joe Rogan’s podcast but not as severe as the bubonic plague before antibiotics.</p>
<p>On the other hand, colleges in 2020 don’t look like colleges in the early 20th century. The contemporary trajectory of higher education has deprived universities of the strong defenses that once secured their survival. Rumblings from within the academy signal that the economic shock of COVID-19 may indeed strike a long term blow unless radical changes are made. The <a href="http://uauoregon.org/faq-spring-2020/" class="broken_link">University of Oregon</a> has proposed cuts to faculty salaries; <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/05/14/missouri-western-cuts-quarter-faculty-along-programs-history-and-more">Missouri Western State University</a> has cut programs and laid off tenured professors; even <a href="https://www.baltimoresun.com/coronavirus/bs-md-johns-hopkins-pay-cuts-20200422-tjkj7pipj5f3xm5xc372wuao4u-story.html">Johns Hopkins University</a> has told its employees to prepare for austerity. Like the slash-and-burn firings that financial institutions executed to stay alive in 2008, universities are slashing their expenditures before all hell breaks loose.</p>
<p>But why would all hell break loose? What have our colleges done wrong&#8212;how badly have they been mismanaged?&#8212;that a year online and another recession have become lethal hazards? In the long and even middle term, the coronavirus won’t change the durable fact that young men and women want to acquire an edge in life’s status game. The business model that has girded universities for a hundred years&#8212;selling prestige, social networks, and maybe a few skills to young strivers&#8212;should be fundamentally stable. So, if higher education falters in its response to the coronavirus and risks institutional instability in the face of a moderate societal threat (at worst), it will signal its own irrelevance loud and clear. The next generation of strivers could lose faith in universities as institutions that grant meaningful prestige. What are universities good for, after all, if not to help solve problems like the coronavirus?</p>
<p>As it is, a crisis of faith has beset higher education for decades. Critics from all corners of the ideological compass have questioned the role played by and the legitimacy of higher education in the life of the polis. Once drivers of innovation and centers for a robust exchange of ideas, Western colleges, <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2019/01/07/western-academias-activism-gridlock-threatens-its-status-as-challengers-rise/">Wael Taji writes</a>, are now a synonym for sclerotic institutions. An excellent way for universities to prove their critics right is to cower, bicker, and count pennies in the face of the pandemic.</p>
<p>Universities that overcome their own sclerotic bloat and manage to lead a charge against the pandemic may, in contrast, prove their worth to regional and national communities. But that task is going to take a dynamism and institutional nimbleness that many universities simply do not possess. Certainly, given the rhetoric about higher education’s declining relevance&#8212;exemplified by the Thiel Fellowship for not attending college&#8212;serious universities will at least recognize the coronavirus for what it is: an opportunity to reassert their role as epicenters of intellectual and practical advances, whether or not they can capitalize on it.</p>
<p>They will spot the social capital that could be regained by becoming the first spaces secured from the virus&#8212;local Green Zones earned through a smart deployment of the human resources that all universities claim to possess. As state leadership falters in its response not only to the virus but to the recent outburst of racial unrest, universities have an opportunity to accomplish locally what has proven impossible to accomplish nationally and to exhibit their autonomy as competent leaders.</p>
<p>Some institutions may take advantage of this once-in-a-century chance. The University of Arizona, for example, has sauntered up to the plate and announced its plan to offer antibody testing to all 60,000 faculty, staff, and students. A good start. However, the reality on the ground is that most collegiate institutions are ill-equipped to pass a test of institutional robustness. Now that “stay home” has emerged as the standard response to the virus, the professoriate has largely <a href="https://twitter.com/friede/status/1254819098275581954">signaled an unwillingness</a> to return to campus or even to strategize what a safe return might look like. And to be fair, administrators who have declared campus open for business in Fall 2020 have done little to assure faculty (or students) that their open campus will be virus-free.</p>
<p>A localized South Korea–style coronavirus response will require strong managerial leadership and open lines of communication. But there is no real administrative hierarchy on any given campus, only a maze of semi-autonomous departments and support units headed by semi-autonomous leaders with competing interests. This lack of governance cohesion&#8212;a direct result of administrative bloat&#8212;works against developing a strong, centralized, and implementable coronavirus plan. Even in normal times, getting departments and administrative units to work together on a common project is notoriously difficult. Entropy is the rule, dynamism the exception on university campuses.</p>
<p>For colleges with pre-existing financial conditions, the coming coronavirus failure may result in insolvency. For everyone else, it will serve as a very public and inescapable justification of higher education’s critics&#8212;maybe not the final nail in the coffin of academia’s legitimacy but at least a long row of nails.</p>
<p>To be sure, creating a local campus Green Zone would be one of the most difficult tasks undertaken by universities since the Second World War. It may well be an <i>impossible</i> task. What is shocking, however, is the binary response that has emerged instead: either a total opening with few to no safeguards (beyond vague promises from administrators to allow at-risk faculty and students to stay online) or a total closure for the 2020-21 school year. The unspoken assumption seems to be that trying and failing to implement a campus Green Zone plan will be worse than doing nothing. This attitude is, of course, exactly the one that a rigid, unadaptable, panicky institution would take.</p>
<p>If administrators and faculty have decided not to seize the opportunity to display their university’s institutional excellence, they at least recognize the short term financial exigency to keep enrollment numbers from dropping. The concern is that students will neither begin, nor continue their degree programs amid the pandemic due to any number of medical or financial concerns; and the fact is that nearly all universities&#8212;public and private&#8212;rely not only on tuition but on an active, open campus to stay solvent.</p>
<p>Higher education’s primary income streams are tuition, state funding, endowments, and what the National Center for Education Statistics calls “other” revenue streams (residence and dining halls, attached hospitals, private and federal contracts, alumni giving, sports revenue, and so on). A look at the numbers <a href="https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cud.asp" class="broken_link">reveals</a> that private non-profit universities receive 32 percent of their revenue from the “other” category, 31 percent from tuition, 18 percent from endowments, and 12 percent from state funding. Public universities receive 41 percent of their revenue from state funding, 28 percent from “other,” 20 percent from tuition and fees, and 4 percent from endowments.</p>
<p>These numbers are averages. A <a href="https://shef.sheeo.org/">report</a> by the State Higher Education Executive Officers Association shows that reliance on tuition and other non-state funding varies widely across public institutions, especially when state funding is calculated not in aggregate but in dollars spent on day-to-day educational operations (that is, when ignoring university expenditures on capital improvement projects and debt servicing). According to their calculations, upwards of 75 percent of per-student educational spending comes from tuition at the least subsidized state systems; across all public institutions, 46 percent of per-student spending comes from tuition, fees, and room and board.</p>
<p>In aggregate, these numbers suggest that tuition and “other” revenue streams, many of which rely on an open campus, emerge as the major income sources for American universities. Tuition alone accounts for 20 percent of revenue at even well-supported state schools to upwards of 60 percent at tuition-reliant private universities, such as <a href="https://www.nyu.edu/about/news-publications/budget/operating-budget/major-categories-of-revenue.html" class="broken_link">New York University</a> and the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-pushes-colleges-to-the-breaking-point-forcing-hard-choices-about-education-11588256157?">small private liberal arts colleges</a> that dot the southern and eastern parts of the United States. For schools reliant not only on tuition but full residence halls, the need to open campus in fall is particularly pronounced. At public universities, state subsidies are a secondary but still vital source of funding.</p>
<p>But states are drowning in a sea of red ink following months of economic shutdown. New York&#8217;s tax receipts <a href="https://www.bloombergquint.com/onweb/n-y-tax-revenue-plummets-68-in-april-state-comptroller-says">fell by 68 percent in April</a>. In Illinois, personal income tax revenue could <a href="https://www.illinoispolicy.org/illinois-personal-income-tax-revenue-could-fall-up-to-6-6-billion-from-covid-19-lockdown/">fall by 14 to 33 percent</a>. California could face a $54 billion shortfall, the largest budget deficit faced by any state in history (though, as Steven Malanga argues, <a href="https://www.city-journal.org/california-record-breaking-deficit">the Golden State’s tarnished budget may have been exacerbated</a> rather than caused by pandemic lockdowns). Every public institution in the nation&#8212;from major flagships to directional state colleges&#8212;knows its capitol subsidizers could mandate cuts to the marrow amid these enormous drops in state revenues.</p>
<p>Like state funding for public universities, endowments for private universities are likewise vulnerable to economic shocks. Endowments are diversified, but during the aftermath of the Great Recession, even Harvard University’s nearly $40 billion endowment  <a href="https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2020/3/19/harvard-coronavirus-endowment-impact/">declined 27 percent</a>. Because economic stability is not likely to return in the near term, university endowments will decline along with everyone else’s portfolios. Moody&#8217;s has <a href="https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Covid-19-puts-pressure-on-higher-education-finances--PBC_1222963" class="broken_link">issued a warning</a> about university finances (they had already done so pre-pandemic for many small liberal arts institutions); Global S&amp;P Ratings now <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2020/05/01/sp-slashes-outlook-127-colleges">gives 38 percent of its rated universities</a> a “negative” outlook, up from 9 percent at the end of 2019.</p>
<p>There is an additional factor in play as colleges make decisions about the upcoming school year: a vital resource that can buy leverage for (some) universities against pandemic uncertainty. That resource is a school’s reputation within the higher education pecking order. The more prestige a university retains in the public imagination, the more it can confidently assume that students will not pause their degree programs, that endowments will be large enough to absorb losses, and that alumni may be more inclined to increase their giving in a show of solidarity.</p>
<p>A potential antibody against the coronavirus’s effects, prestige is nonetheless divided unequally among academic institutions. Cambridge University, for instance, has self-assuredly announced its decision to remain closed in Fall 2020. Cambridge is freer than other schools to make this choice and risk enrollment attrition because, first of all, <a href="https://www.cam.ac.uk/system/files/reports_and_financial_statements_2019_final.pdf">tuition is a trivial source of income</a> at Cambridge. Research grants, private assessment services, and even its university publishing arm provide more revenue than tuition and student fees. To this equation Cambridge can also factor in the benefit of its elite status; its board is rightly confident that few students will drop out of <i>Cambridge University</i> simply because they go online for a term or two. Not many students are willing to give up the reputation bestowed by a Cambridge acceptance, even if it means a subpar Cambridge experience.</p>
<p>Johns Hopkins University, in contrast, seems less willing to rely on its academic stature to keep students enrolled. Without a doubt, Johns Hopkins exists at the center of American academia. One can assume a term online will not send enrollment numbers into freefall. However, unlike Cambridge, Johns Hopkins faces a major threat to another income source&#8212;its attached hospital system, which <a href="https://www.baltimoresun.com/coronavirus/bs-hs-hospitals-burdened-by-coronavirus-costs-20200508-mvqlqhaoyreozgs3tsjv3emuvu-story.html">took an enormous hit</a> as elective procedures were canceled in preparation for COVID-19. JHU plans to reopen campus in fall. Against the backdrop of losses from hospital revenue, the university’s decision-makers have presumably decided not to gamble on tuition attrition, as trivial as it would be given the school’s reputation. Such is the financial uncertainty at even America’s most elite colleges.</p>
<p>Further down the status totem pole, Western Missouri State University provides an example of an institution with pre-existing conditions that the <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/05/14/missouri-western-cuts-quarter-faculty-along-programs-history-and-more">pandemic is simply accelerating</a>. According to Inside Higher Ed, the college has faced over a 20 percent reduction in students during the previous decade while tuition has remained flat. What may have amounted to a slow burn of losses over the next decade has turned into sudden attrition in the face of pandemic induced uncertainty. In total, 25 percent of MWSU’s full-time faculty will be gone by 2021. Programs on the chopping block include everything from history to economics. And while the school can continue to rely on minimal state subsidies, small private colleges facing similar enrollment trends will risk bankruptcy if the coronavirus keeps a non-trivial percentage of students at home in the coming semesters.</p>
<p>Universities must navigate this complex amalgam of revenue streams, threats to revenue, and status realities to make decisions. Across the board, however, campuses that stay functionally closed will be staring down the same fate that threatens any business under extended lockdown: financial anemia at best or infeasibility at worst. No wonder administrators want to throw open the doors, whether or not they’ve developed a plan to keep their campus as safe as possible. Offering lackluster online education and failing to provide the social and professional networks that universities can only provide in fleshspace, higher education&#8212;even schools with ample amounts of prestige&#8212;may risk insolvency in the short term or lose legitimacy after the pandemic has faded (perhaps at a ten- or twenty-year horizon) as the West loses faith in collegiate institutions as centers of social, political, and intellectual life.</p>
<p>After all, what would a year or two of mass online education mean? Almost overnight, as far as the public image is concerned, it would turn large swaths of academia into the University of Phoenix, as everything from liberal arts colleges to flagship universities suddenly provide an education identical to for-profit online schools: institutions that exist on paper or behind screens, offering videos and discussion boards in exchange for a credential. There is no indication that the pandemic will do anything to stop the job market’s demand for a bachelor’s degree as an entry-level credential for white-collar work. But if academia by and large decides it’s going online until a vaccine is available, then what’s the difference, at the end of the day, between one online credentialing mechanism and another? Aside from the Harvards, Cambridges, and Berkeleys of the world, the vast majority of online-only universities will be inseparable. University of State, Directional College, Liberal Arts Academy&#8212;what’s the difference? Students will simply flock to whichever program is cheapest or offers the quickest path to the credential.</p>
<p>From Grand Canyon University to Southern New Hampshire University, the trend for schools to go all-in on mass online education&#8212;trading their local, on-campus prestige for a national audience and a lot more money&#8212;is already underway. While this trend may be salutary for schools that would otherwise go bankrupt, institutions higher up the academic pecking order would presumably rather keep their prestige and stay out of the mass-market game. Hence, again, the demand to reopen campus. Smart administrators know that, in the long run, local or regional prestige offers more institutional longevity than the mass-market model. There are, in the end, a limited number of students across North America (and even globally). If thousands of universities suddenly find themselves competing online for a limited set of students, there will be the inevitable winners and losers. A Purdue or an Emory could fade in the long term if they adopt this model, whereas retaining regional prestige could ensure centuries of continued operations.</p>
<p>If universities whose names aren’t Harvard or Cambridge have any interest in holding onto their regional or national prestige-granting powers&#8212;if they have any interest in being more than another mass-market online school that offers online videos in exchange for a white-collar credential&#8212;they should be using this summer not to find ways to slash budgets but to develop the best coronavirus response they can muster. It will, as noted, be extremely difficult and perhaps impossible to accomplish. But ideas are already emerging, and it would be foolish to do nothing while other, more nimble businesses and institutions return and thrive in the coming year.</p>
<p>Anxious times call for cool and calculated leadership. This is a perfect moment for universities to step up and provide it. Universities all through the status hierarchy should rally their resources, both human and capital, to make their campuses coronavirus free&#8212;think Singapore or South Korea. Assertive safety protocols and a bit of health theater are the only ways to ensure a confident return of domestic and international students and wary faculty. The goal for each school, in other words, must be to turn its entire campus into something like a local Green Zone.</p>
<p>We know what can be done to keep coronavirus transmission to a minimum: contact tracing, individual quarantines, mass testing, mass antibody testing, and perhaps sewage monitoring (which <a href="https://www.health.com/condition/infectious-diseases/coronavirus/coronavirus-sewage-testing" class="broken_link">may predict an outbreak by up to a week</a>). All these tactics have vexed national and state leaders. But implementing locally what larger institutions have struggled to implement nationally should be viable for universities that pride themselves on their intellectual excellence and scientific capabilities. Executing a South Korea-style pandemic protocol&#8212;and demonstrating its success with minimal COVID-19 cases by the end of Fall 2020&#8212;will not only gird universities’ chances of fiscal survival but, more importantly, will reaffirm higher education’s role as an incubator of ideas, a repository of the brightest minds, and a vision of what humanity at its best can achieve.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/university-of-arizona-president-on-testing-all-60000-students-staff-2020-5">The University of Arizona was</a> already mentioned. In early May, its president announced plans to roll out antibody testing for all 60,000 faculty, staff, and students, calling his plan “a model for other colleges and universities as they try and reopen their campuses.” The university already produces materials for COVID-19 kits, so, presumably, a test for the virus itself is something the university can provide. But given the large number of asymptomatic cases, identifying those who have already been infected by the virus is an equally important step toward expediting a safe reopening. As Arizona’s president Robert Robbins explains, widespread antibody testing will allow university residents and employees to know who has or has not developed immunity to the virus. This knowledge, along with testing and quarantine of symptomatic patients, will “significantly reduce concerns about someone&#8217;s ability to contract or spread the virus on our campus&#8230;[Antibody testing] is a quick, cost-efficient means of helping Arizona students assess their level of risk.” COVID-19 testing for the sick; antibody testing for everyone else. It’s a good formula. Allowing the antibody-positive to advertise their immunity somehow would go another step toward making campus feel safer.</p>
<p>To widespread testing, a university can add many other strategies viable for any institution that has its management practices in order. Temperature monitors can be placed at each building and dorm entrance; paid student workers can be used for this work. A school can partner with the local utilities district and a local lab or hospital to monitor campus sewage, getting a jump on any spike in COVID-19 levels detected. It can, of course, require masks in all enclosed spaces. It can move courses outside where possible. It can begin courses several weeks early, so that the semester finishes before a presumed winter return of the virus. The list of ideas grows larger by the week.</p>
<p>One of the harder challenges to meet is how to control the virus on campus when students, faculty, staff, and logistics personnel (e.g., food delivery trucks) are constantly coming and going. This will be a more difficult problem for commuter than for residential campuses, but in both cases, a draconian hand will be required: no travel outside the city during the semester; 14-day quarantine for anyone who does travel outside the city (and the university must, of course, secure a quarantine space, either in defunct dorms, local motels, or hospitals); and cell-phone tracking for both symptomatic and asymptomatic cases (who will have been discovered through widespread testing!).</p>
<p>Most Americans bristle at the idea of the state tracking their cell phones, but the majority of students will likely resign themselves to being tracked by their local university as a precondition of enrollment. Cell phone tracking seems to be a major component in East Asia’s success in controlling the virus, so, if it were pitched as a necessary (and temporary) ingredient in an overall Green Zone plan, COVID-19 positive students and faculty may not only resign themselves to being tracked but do so willingly. Universities will likely need to expand the IT department’s budget to implement a cell phone tracking protocol, but for such an essential component of a safety plan, no expense should be spared.</p>
<p>Students or faculty who have come into contact with a COVID-19 positive individual will of course be tested immediately. If quarantine is necessary at any time (due to a positive test or due to travel outside the accepted limits), students will simply need to communicate with their professors and stay caught up on coursework via email until they no longer test positive, which, in most cases, should be only a few weeks. (Faculty across North America can admit that every course ends up having one or two students who disappear and return during the semester, so this will be nothing new.) Faculty who must quarantine will need to hand materials to an adjunct or lecturer, who will take over the course for a few weeks and whose pay will be prorated accordingly.</p>
<p>Logistics visitors&#8212;delivery drivers and such&#8212;needn’t be tracked, but they will need to submit to a temperature check before entering campus, and perhaps they should be targeted for more regular virus and antibody testing than the campus community. A university, after all, cannot be as draconian with non-affiliated workers as it can be with employees and students. Of course, a nimble and dynamic university would commit itself to sourcing food and other necessities from local vendors, within city or regional limits, so that even their “outside” visitors are by and large from the community.</p>
<p>For universities with fewer capital resources than are necessary for a full and safe re-opening, a hybrid approach is still better than going fully online, as long as it provides students a reason to be on campus each week. Erik Simpson of Grinnell University <a href="https://twitter.com/ErikTheSimpson/status/1265697084700798979">imagines</a> a scenario where large lectures are moved online&#8212;Zoom being a perfect medium for one-to-many communication&#8212;while classrooms become meeting spaces for small study groups led by professors or lecturers. More meetings with fewer students would rearrange the normal timeline of university operations, but it would also give students more personal facetime with their teachers.</p>
<p>Another hybrid strategy includes offering an online and an on-campus track for each course, so that faculty and students who want to return can do so, while those with pre-existing conditions don’t feel pressured to do the same. It would be an IT and logistical nightmare, but it shouldn’t be impossible to add an Online/On Campus option into the course enrollment system; universities could then hire more lecturers if necessary or merge online options where possible (e.g., three or four large sections of Sophomore English or College Algebra instead of dozens). I imagine this sort of hybrid approach will be more manageable than it seems. The reality is that the <a href="https://www.axios.com/college-students-attend-class-fall-6e67fcec-3e9d-4a2d-92b7-be48cbe244f6.html" class="broken_link">majority of students want to return</a>, and that wary students can be convinced with uncompromising and well-supported safety policies. As far as at-risk faculty are concerned, exemptions can be made on a case-by-case basis; asking older faculty or those with pre-existing conditions to teach online for the 2020-21 school year could even be part of the overall campus Green Zone plan.</p>
<p>An additional concern related to enrollment is that students or their parents may have lost jobs and found themselves unable to afford tuition. To address that particular issue, aggressive tuition reduction or scholarship programs should be made available. Each campus or system will need to calculate how aggressive it can be given other financial exigencies, but most universities can afford to “make up in bulk” what it loses from an individual tuition check, if reduced tuition means steady or even rising enrollment numbers. The University of Nebraska system, for example, has declared that anyone whose family earns less than $60,000 per year will now <a href="https://nebraska.edu/nebraska-promise">receive a full-tuition scholarship</a>. It has also <a href="https://nebraska.edu/news-and-events/news/2020/05/president-ted-carter-announces-two-year-university-of-nebraska-tuition-freeze">committed to a two-year freeze</a> in tuition hikes for everyone else. Like many universities, Nebraska earns as much if not more from students living in residence halls, eating in dining halls, and buying books from bookstores as it does from tuition; if it will hedge against enrollment losses, it makes sense to waive tuition to ensure that these “other” revenue streams will remain steady or even grow during the pandemic.</p>
<p>Examples such as the Universities of Nebraska and Arizona&#8212;and professors such as Dr. Simpson&#8212;show that there is an appetite, locally at least, for academic dynamism, nimbleness, and leadership in the face of the coronavirus. However, the overall institutional reality discussed earlier means that these examples are few and far between. The reality, to reiterate, is that most collegiate institutions are ill-equipped to pass a test of institutional robustness and leadership. Forget <i>leadership</i>&#8212;there is even evidence that universities are <a href="https://twitter.com/ibogost/status/1271173454360961026" class="broken_link">feigning their commitment</a> to reopening in fall, and simply waiting to announce an online semester until the enrollment checks have been cashed. Also, few administrators have the stomach for implementing the admittedly draconian policies necessary for a full test-and-trace protocol. And the university is not a hierarchy but a patchwork of autonomous units; all it takes is one reticent dean or department chair for an otherwise solid plan to fall apart entirely.</p>
<p>The deeper problem is the rigidity that plagues too many universities. The source of this problem is that the fundamental work of the West’s institutions of higher learning has been tainted with perverse incentives. The core concern of nearly everyone on campus&#8212;from lowly assistant professors to top administrators&#8212;is how to secure funding (or how to land publications and tenure), rather than how to solve social and scientific problems. The workflow has been reversed. Rather than asking essential questions or inquiring into worthwhile puzzles (however that statement is construed across different disciplines) and believing that financial support will follow good work, as a matter of course, academia now concerns itself first and foremost with landing the financial support, then dressing up its intellectual work in whatever costumes necessary in order to secure that support. Follow the trail of replication crises, retracted papers, and research fraud to see what happens when the money&#8212;and the individual prestige that comes along with it&#8212;becomes more important than what the money is supposed to be for.</p>
<p>Because the fundamental academic question has become <i>How can I get money to solve this?</i> rather than <i>How can I solve this?</i>, it is no wonder that, collectively, academia seems unable to pool its resources to solve a problem. Its chief concern is, once again, the money. As it stands, then, the pandemic looks to separate the true institutions of higher learning from the credential granting corporations. Universities that work to solve the problem of keeping campuses coronavirus free can confidently assume that tuition dollars will follow. Universities that scramble to adjust balance sheets in order to survive a year of online-only education&#8212;that is, universities who put the money before the problem&#8212;can be sure that enrollment attrition will indeed be a self-inflicted crisis.</p>
<p>For universities who believe they have the prestige to retain paying customers without offering the services paid for, or the financial security to risk short term attrition&#8212;we cannot begrudge their decision to stay locked down. For other institutions, however, the online approach is financially risky and, more detrimentally, sets a bad precedent for higher education. It signals to students, faculty, and regional communities that their university is not up to the task of keeping its own campus safe; it signals that its human resources are not so resourceful after all; it signals that the West’s crisis of faith in its university system is more founded than academics want to admit. Federal and private organizations may be willing to continue sending grant money, but if students no longer want to pay to partake in whatever universities are spending it on, then the entire game is over. No university in North America (and only a few in Europe) can operate as pure research institutions without student tuition, residence halls, or alumni giving.</p>
<p>It’s true that some campus Green Zone strategies will work better than others; some strategies will be more or less feasible at different campuses; some strategies will fail; and it’s imperative that online options be made available for at-risk faculty and students. But for universities up and down the status hierarchy, the spirit of the approach should be to meet COVID-19 as a challenge, not to retreat until it passes them over, or to pray they won’t succumb to it. To repeat the basic argument: the best thing a university can do right now is to turn itself into a local safe zone by pooling and managing its fiscal and human resources and implementing on-campus what only a few nations have managed to implement at a large scale. In the process, a university will prove its worth to the community and exhibit what’s possible when human minds from diverse disciplines work together. Such an institution will be valued and emulated, its position at the center of social, political, and intellectual life secured.</p>
<p>It remains to be seen, however, which institutions possess the substance to match this vaunted rhetoric about the value of Western academia. For those institutions that have decided they are not up to the task, they can look forward to becoming just another mass-market online educator, one more commercial on daytime TV competing for whatever students they can get.</p>
<div class="author-bio">
<p class="author-description">Seth Largo holds degrees in linguistics and rhetoric. A native of Los Angeles’ suburban sprawl, he is now an English professor on the high plains.</p>
</div>The post <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2020/06/26/the-green-zone-plan-to-reopen-universities/">The Green Zone Plan to Reopen Universities
</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/">Palladium</a>.]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">3346</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>The University System Isn&#8217;t Going Anywhere
</title>
		<link>https://www.palladiummag.com/2019/12/13/the-university-system-isnt-going-anywhere/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Seth Largo]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Dec 2019 19:26:29 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Universities have endured plague, population collapse, scandal, and even outlasted nations. Despite proclamations of the university system's death, one thing is certain: it's not going anywhere.</p>
The post <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2019/12/13/the-university-system-isnt-going-anywhere/">The University System Isn’t Going Anywhere
</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/">Palladium</a>.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The university is a strange creature. It’s a nexus of learning and power. It provides minds to fill elite positions, and yet eludes any kind of official political control in modern Western countries. It embodies both the establishment and every major wave of social rebellion. Why would such a thing even exist? What kind of patron would endow his own opponents and replacements?</p>
<p>The answer&#8212;a very brief one&#8212;requires a glance back to the 11th century. As the feudal world governed by illiteracy and duels began to evolve into a slightly less feudal world governed by canon and civil law, words scribbled on paper were acquiring moral and legal weight, and the literate arts reemerging as mediums of power, as they had been in Rome and Greece.</p>
<p>The medieval upper classes, no fools to changing trends, realized that to retain power and status in this new world, their progeny would need to wield not just swords but words in the arenas of law, politics, and religion. To learn logic, rhetoric, and theology, the next generation would obviously require lessons from the current masters of these arts. Thus did the urban centers of medieval Europe witness the emergence of student-teacher guilds, called <i>scholae</i>.</p>
<p>Unorganized at first, these guilds quickly gained popularity, and with popularity came the demand to organize. Guilds gathered into a unified school&#8212;a university. In some places (such as the University of Paris), teachers gained control over curricular and degree-granting matters. In others (such as the University of Bologna), students had more control. In both cases, resources for buildings and the legal imprimatur upholding degrees came from the crown or the church, who wanted to own a stake in these new incubators of power and privilege.</p>
<p>Money for teachers came from the students directly, most of whom, to repeat, hailed from wealthy families. There was no set fee, so, in essence, the medieval professor lived on tips and the generosity of the rich. When we imagine a medieval scholar, we likely conjure a man wearing a large hooded gown (such as are still worn at graduation ceremonies). As the history goes, professors hung their gowns by the classroom door, and as students walked by, they dropped money into the gown’s hood. The more popular the professor, the more coins in the hood.</p>
<p>Twenty years ago, in November 1999, writer and professor <a href="http://perryglasser.com/html/body_medieval_strategy.html" class="broken_link">Perry Glaser noted the emerging trend of online education</a> and offered a tongue-in-cheek prediction about its effect on academia: it would return professors to a medieval state, he said, as they once more became academic entrepreneurs unshielded by tenure or a salary but nevertheless able to earn a high standard of living if they gained an audience. The wandering digital scholar, like the wandering scholar of old, could set up a “classroom” via whatever digital platform he liked, peddle his courses to interested students (a whole digital world of them), and charge a small fee for the course or request donations at the end of one. Whether this new twist on the old state of affairs would be a salutary or horrifying change to academia would be a matter of personal temperament.</p>
<p>Twenty years on, at the end of the 2010s, how has Glaser’s prediction fared? What can the prediction’s success or failure tell us about the next 20, 30, or 100 years of Western academia?</p>
<p>We needn’t look far to discover digital analogues to the wandering medieval scholar who peddled his intellectual wares to whoever wanted to pay money for them. Monetized YouTube tutorials, Patreon accounts, <a href="https://courses.abeautifulmess.com/all-courses/" class="broken_link">video and photo editing courses</a>, <a href="https://www.teacherspayteachers.com/" class="broken_link">teacher resource apps</a>, any number of <a href="https://www.themuse.com/advice/50-cheap-professional-development-classes-anyone-can-take" class="broken_link">all-purpose professional development workshops</a>, Ribbon Farm’s <a href="https://www.refactorcamp.com/">Refactor Camps</a>, Other Internet’s <a href="https://otherinter.net/workshops/">digital media workshops</a>, the <a href="https://thenewcentre.org/parallel-academia/" class="broken_link">New Centre for Research and Practice</a> (which literally allows you to add courses to a cart before checking out with a course registration). To these examples, we might add the pay-nothing-until-you-get-a-job programs offered by Lambda School and Microverse; these online schools, helmed by tech professionals and not academics, charge fees only when students land a job with the tech-oriented skills learned through their programs.</p>
<p>In short, people are taking advantage of the internet’s ability to connect students with the masters of various arts&#8212;from the art of video editing to the art of elementary school curricular design to the art of digital media theorizing to the art of coding. (Indeed, an “influencer” who charges money for online books or courses is precisely what Glaser was getting at when he highlighted the internet’s entrepreneurial potential for academics.) Digital gowns hang by the digital door, and students are dropping coins into the hood via PayPal, Bitcoin, Venmo.</p>
<p>However, while the examples above (and many others) tap into the internet’s entrepreneurial potential, one obvious thing is missing&#8212;professors. Elementary school teachers, housewives, teenagers, IT professionals, Instagram celebrities, pick-up artists, and health and wellness experts will all be found leading online workshops or courses in the educational gig economy. But professors are few and far between. To be sure, one can find online courses taught by professors <i>qua</i> professors&#8212;for example, via <a href="https://ocw.mit.edu/index.htm">MIT’s Open Course Ware</a>&#8212;but as a general rule, these online courses will be free. What’s more, online university programs&#8212;free or not&#8212;have no bearing on Glaser’s prediction because they are helmed by professors and lecturers paid by the university itself, not by students via a direct monetary transfer, as in the middle ages. Jordan Peterson is the exception that proves the rule. He has amassed a large number of “students” online who pay Peterson directly, not under the auspices of an official university program. Tellingly, however, Peterson has more or less quit his post as a professor.</p>
<p>As a general observation, though, professors are largely absent from the educational gig economy. One reason for the absence is that most digital entrepreneurs/teachers&#8212;earning tips directly from students&#8212;sell what we can lump together as “practical” skills that hold value and bestow (potential) status without a concomitant degree or university stamp. How to Use Layer Masks in Photoshop; Video Editing Basics; Web Design Fundamentals; Getting Started with Git; Build Your Personal Brand; Project Management Practices; Web Application Development. Insofar as courses like these are the bread and butter of wandering digital teachers, they appeal to students wanting to learn specific skills that are marketable on their own or somehow beneficial within their career contexts. Academics, it seems, remain above it all.</p>
<p>The universities, on the other hand, do not derive the value of their programs from the intrinsic value of what they teach, but from the social status and official credentials they grant. They can afford a much larger gap between what they teach, and what the market wants to learn. Interpret this positively or negatively; either way, it’s no surprise to see academic professors stay within the academy, and avoid competing on the market which would not necessarily be interested in their wares.</p>
<p>Of course, Peterson’s books, courses such as Sonya Mann’s &#8220;<a href="https://otherinter.net/workshops/fafm/">Friends as Force Multipliers</a>&#8221; or <a href="https://thenewcentre.org/">courses at the New Centre</a> offer traditional scholarly material and do in fact incarnate Glaser’s idea about the wandering medieval scholar reborn as the digital entrepreneur. Indeed, the New Centre’s “parallel academia” model&#8212;which, like the medieval university, does not employ professors but merely offers a space wherein professors earn whatever coin their courses bring in&#8212;would be exactly the sort of thing to generate a new version of Western academia, one that, ironically, as Glaser predicted, looks just like the medieval version. Nevertheless, for now, monetized tutorials on YouTube earn their creators far more coin than a New Centre course does for its instructors.</p>
<p>It seems Glaser’s prediction is half true: people are dubbing themselves teachers and using social media to connect with students and student fees. The educational gig economy has bloomed. Why aren’t academics getting in on the action? If the New Centre’s parallel academy or Other Internet’s boutique workshops prove anything, they prove that there <i>is</i> a potential audience for academic topics as such, taught online, outside the confines of a traditional university program. Why aren’t there as many parallel academies popping up as YouTube tutorials? Why don’t we see hundreds of professors attempting to copy Peterson, popularizing their specialized material for the masses?</p>
<p>The answer to those questions highlights a flaw in Glaser’s prediction, but more importantly, they highlight crucial features of the Western university that, in my view, has played and will play a larger role in its cultural evolution than the advent of digital media.</p>
<p>Recall the university’s medieval history. Once student-teacher guilds organized into single universities, a question that needed answering was the question of legitimacy&#8212;from where came the power to transform a slip of paper into a degree with rights and privileges? The imprimatur for the degree ultimately came from the church or the state, who granted charters to universities. In effect, they girded the university’s slips of paper with the powers of popes and kings.</p>
<p>As the centuries went by, universities that survived into the modern era slowly absorbed their medieval privileges into their own “brands,” as we might say today. Kings lost their powers; universities lost none of theirs. At some point, the <i>universitas</i> in Oxford became the University of Oxford and no longer required a throne’s backing to grant status via slips of paper. Its degrees retained and continue to retain all the status that once came with a king’s charter or a pope’s decree. Insofar as all universities share in this status of divine or kingly power&#8212;transmuted across the centuries into secular status inherent in the university itself&#8212;the professors who teach there get a slice of that status. Add to this a salary and tenure (a modern invention) and it’s no wonder that academics see no reason to operate a side hustle online, to become pedagogical entrepreneurs like their medieval predecessors. Leave that to the housewives, teenagers, IT professionals, and Peterson-esque popularizers.</p>
<p>Plato critiqued the sophists for charging money for their courses on rhetoric. Contemporary academics likewise behave as though peddling material online&#8212;for direct transfer tips from students&#8212;is beneath their office. Glaser neglected to consider the inherent elitism of academia. Professors who pursue anything that smacks of a digital side hustle&#8212;from the right-leaning Peterson to the left-leaning Zizek&#8212;are considered gauche at best, rogue at worst. Professors, myself included, can earn extra money if we need it by teaching summer courses through the imprimatur of our university, which, after all, pays our salary and provides our status.</p>
<p>This issue of academic status raises an obvious question, one that dovetails with concerns about a “higher education bubble”&#8212;if universities lose their status and if degrees lose their status-granting imprimatur, will professors finally get involved in the educational gig economy? Glaser’s prediction ultimately rises or falls not on educational technology as a disruptive force but on the university’s ability to maintain status amid the disruption.</p>
<p>Which, of course, it will maintain. Universities will maintain not only their status but their monopoly on granting status via slips of paper. History indicates as much.</p>
<p>The system of higher education has maintained elite standing across nearly a millennium of disruptive history, as have the degrees it confers. Kings and popes have lost their power, but the prestige they once bestowed on universities (and ipso facto their degrees) has grown through countless social, political, demographic, and technological transformations. The case that the digital transformation will strike a fatal blow to Oxford, Harvard, UCLA, or even most Directional State Universities, is shockingly poor.</p>
<p>How will they continue to exist? The key is their role as cultural centers that draw students seeking to gain money and power&#8212;which, after all, was the reason medieval student-teacher guilds formed in the first place. Their power to grant wealthy or upwardly mobile teenagers an economic and cultural edge on the competition, in associational credentials and relationships, is much harder to disrupt than mere course content.</p>
<p>Like the printing press, the internet has disrupted many industries and institutions, but scant evidence suggests that it will keep universities from continuing to attract students seeking an edge, any more than the printing press did. Indeed, universities have been quick to expand their reach through digital education, primarily by hiring more instructors and paying them less&#8212;often referred to as the “adjunctification” of higher education. These non-tenured lecturers and adjuncts may be wandering digital scholars in a sense, but they still receive their pay&#8212;such as it is&#8212;from universities.</p>
<p>The university has survived demographic transformations, as well as technological ones. In previous centuries, the Western university survived multiple plague outbreaks that make current population concerns look like a bagatelle: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Death">40-50% of the European population</a> died in the 1300s, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Plague_of_London">25% of London’s</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1629%E2%80%931631_Italian_plague">14% of Italy’s population</a> died in the 1600s, 20% of Moscow’s population died in the 1700s. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_plague_pandemic">And on and on</a>. To disease we can of course add war&#8212;for example, the Thirty Years War destroyed 30% of Germany’s population between 1618 and 1648. The West’s population may be aging and shrinking, but the pool of potential students is and will continue to be a thousand times larger than the tiny ones upon which universities once survived and even thrived.</p>
<p>Those bearish on higher education may ask: well, what if the population loses faith in the university’s ability to bestow status via a degree&#8212;a loss of faith never experienced by the admittedly plague- and disease-ravaged middle ages and early modern era?</p>
<p>This is a more challenging question. One reason Europe’s universities maintained their reputations as the world burned around them was that very few students went to or graduated from universities. To hold a university degree was a mark of high merit and&#8212;let’s be honest&#8212;familial wealth. In America, as recently as the late 1970s, universities awarded only  about 850,000 bachelor’s degrees each year. Today, universities award<a href="https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d18/tables/dt18_322.10.asp"> nearly two million degrees each year</a>. Doctorate degrees have likewise ballooned from 10,000 per year in the mid-20th century to <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/12/10/are-numbers-doctorates-awarded-finally-starting-reflect-poor-academic-job-market">55,000 per year in the 2010s</a>. As universities have decided to grant more slips of paper to more students, degrees have become less scarce and thus less able to bestow status and uphold reputation. Jobs that once required only a high school diploma&#8212;for example, retail management&#8212;now demand a B.A. or B.Sc. as part of entry-level hiring requirements.</p>
<p>To this diminution in a degree’s status we can add the related problem of student debt. Outside the Ivy League and other selective institutions, universities by and large decided to grant more and more degrees, which brought in not only more students but more dollars from tuition and/or state funding. The universities grew. And to keep up with the demand, subsidized loans, and cost of expansion, tuition also grew. It is a complex web to untangle, whether lax student loan practices or cuts to state funding for higher education are more to blame for rising tuition, but the simple fact is that as tuition costs rose to absurd heights, students kept demanding access to universities, and universities were happy to let them in. Fast forward to 2019, and the total American student loan debt stands at $1.4 trillion.</p>
<p>A university degree has lost much of its informal reputation as a status marker; at the same time, the cost of a degree has not only risen, but become an unbearable debt burden. No wonder students are starting to question whether or not these degrees are worth the trouble. Surely, there are less expensive ways to gain an economic and cultural edge? This is, indeed, a difficult challenge faced by the university system&#8212;a crisis of faith in its ability to grant status.</p>
<p>However, amid this status anxiety, many universities continue to grow and attract students. Places like Harvard and MIT don’t need to expand at all, so secure is their ability to grant status via their degrees.</p>
<p>Why? In the current institutional imagination, not having a degree at all means you are not smart enough to go to college, and therefore last pick for jobs. This remains a more important distinction than the distinction between top colleges vs. everyone else, so on the margin, few are able to profitably opt out of the rapidly inflating degree race. But as financial and cultural pressure mounts against mass education, we may see this condition collapse. It may be that enough high quality people opt out entirely for financial and ideological reasons, and degrees become inflated enough, that industries will stop considering degrees important.</p>
<p>That lack of faith will be directed primarily at small regional universities whose histories trace back no further than the late 1800s or early 1900s. Even <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelhorn/2018/12/13/will-half-of-all-colleges-really-close-in-the-next-decade/#14e5968452e5" class="broken_link">the worst case, doomsday scenario</a> for higher education’s near future predicts bankruptcy only for the bottom 25% of each university category (research, master’s granting, liberal arts, and so on). That means, in other words, that most universities will indeed survive the coming demographic crunch and whatever status-anxiety issues emerge alongside it.</p>
<p>Even without the semi-artificial credential value of college vs no college, which is becoming more and more fake, the signal value of elite selective schools is a different and much more real effect, and isn’t going anywhere. And in an ultimate sense, it’s really the top universities that matter in their academic work and effect on society. The modern trend towards universal college education is likely a temporary aberration from the much more solid underlying reality of a small core of top universities being about elite formation.</p>
<p>The future might well look less like a total collapse of academia and more of a hollowing out of the middle. Small niche or private schools and large global centers of academia will go on. But the middle schools which lack high enough status or specific enough differentiation will be hit. A relevant comparison might be made to the banking sector, where small and medium institutions have been eroded for a number of years due to both regulation and their inability to provide the huge pools of liquidity which many financial deals require.</p>
<p>This durability shouldn’t be a total surprise. The Western university has survived not only plagues and wars but many other social, political, religious, and technological upheavals. A thousand years of history have put higher education through the gauntlet, and the university has made it through every filter.</p>
<p>To be sure, <i>particular universities</i> did not survive history’s filters. For example, the University of Wittenberg&#8212;the center of Protestant reform&#8212;survived Professor Luther’s Reformation and the ensuing wars of religion but did not survive the Napoleonic Wars, after which it merged with a Prussian university. More recently, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Defunct_universities_and_colleges_in_the_United_States_by_state" class="broken_link">hundreds of American universities</a> have also failed to survive the demographic and economic upheavals of the previous century. For example, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Detroit_Institute_of_Technology">the Detroit Institute of Technology</a>&#8212;-opened in 1891&#8212;did not survive the early 1980s recession, closing its doors in 1981. Its fate was likely sealed during the demographic hollowing out of Detroit that began in the 1960s. By 1979, with fewer Detroit natives to enroll, Detroit Tech had tapped the international student market: a third of its students were foreign Iranian nationals, most of whom were suddenly forced to drop out when their visas were suspended during the Iran hostage crisis. This dual demographic and economic filter proved too much for Henry Ford’s alma mater.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, hundreds&#8212;thousands&#8212;of other universities have survived, thrived, and grown during America’s turbulent history. The university system’s internal ability to filter out weak performers is, if anything, a mark of its overall success. Indeed, I would be more worried about an “education bubble” if financially weak or fly-by-night schools&#8212;such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mt_Sierra_College">Mt. Sierra College</a>&#8212;had <i>not</i> closed down.</p>
<p>To survive the current filters, transformations, and disruptions&#8212;particularly the question of small universities’ ability to grant status via their degrees&#8212;some schools will need to shift emphasis to those arts that, in the popular imagination, offer a doorway to status. In the middle ages, the humanistic arts were the ones in demand. Most people were illiterate or semi-literate; literacy was the rising medium of power; to become not only literate but skilled in literacy provided an economic and social advantage. From the 1100s to the late 1800s, knowing how to do things with words&#8212;how to compose a solid legal argument or to deliver a fiery sermon&#8212;ensured a degree of status and respect, or at least a shot at economic security.</p>
<p>Today, all the same can be said about the electronic and scientific arts. It’s no surprise that, for example, the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point rolled out a plan last year to cut humanities majors and shift resources to career-oriented STEM fields. I expect many minor universities will adopt similar plans. However, this is an organic transformation, undergone in the face of changing economic trends, that will allow smaller institutions to survive the present economic filter. It is not at all an indication of a dying university system. Ironically, and to my larger point about the university’s stability in the face of disruption, even this lowly, regional school recently<a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/04/11/stevens-point-abandons-controversial-plan-cut-liberal-arts-majors-including-history"> decided not to pursue its plan to cut humanities programs</a>.</p>
<p>And of course, the disruptive 2010s have shown that the ancient arts of persuasion and aesthetics will continue to play a role in competitions for status and prestige. As <a href="https://twitter.com/SamoBurja/status/1199478895482830848">Samo Burja and others</a> are beginning to note, humanistic arts are useful <i>precisely in these moments of great demographic and economic transition</i>. If anything, I expect an emergence of interdisciplinary university programs that emphasize the importance of both STEM and the humanities.</p>
<p>My bet, then, is on the survival and even the growth of the university system in the decades and century to come&#8212;even as that growth demands the disappearance of smaller, financially feeble institutions. As long as people want to increase status and gain an economic and social edge, the university will continue to be one of the best places to do so, just as it has been for a thousand years. Don’t expect professors&#8212;especially tenured ones&#8212;to participate in the educational gig economy online, anymore than you’d expect Formula 1 racers to drive for Uber. Their status protects them from insecure, entrepreneurial work.</p>
<p>However, in fairness to people bearish on higher education, I want to offer an asterisk on my position. To do so, I’ll need to return to Jordan Peterson by way of another history lesson.</p>
<p>For a thousand years, amid all manner of political disruption, reformers and radicals have sought to capture the university, not to destroy or subvert it&#8212;a fact that applies to many important social institutions. Traditionally, after all, universities hold a monopoly on the “correct” interpretation of things. Just ask Copernicus. To capture the university means to capture an intellectual authority structure, to exert a persuasive force over society’s intellectual outlook.  Of course, subverting sanctioned academic interpretations might be an early tactic adopted by reformers, but what they really want is to gain a foothold in the university, so that their own interpretations gain assent and political weight.</p>
<p>Before they win access to the university and other centers of power, radicals will often replicate what goes on in a university in their own shadowy educational spheres&#8212;all those meetings and struggle sessions in bohemian flats. The existence of this discourse offers a direct threat to the university’s monopoly on interpretation. This is why academics have a tendency to belittle knowledge not produced in a university; so, radicals often rely on new media&#8212;new information technologies&#8212;to facilitate their parallel discourse. The Protestant Reformers provide the obvious template. Martin Luther and his followers used the printing press to spread a very different interpretation of the Bible than the one taught in orthodox universities and seminaries. One can imagine the world of printed Protestant tracts and illicit Protestant meetings as a sort of technologically enabled, parallel university system. However, as they gained political power, the Reformers did not stay outside the system but took control over those sanctioned intellectual spaces&#8212;the halls and towering buttresses of Europe’s universities and seminaries.</p>
<p>Since the Reformation, one can find any number of similar iterations&#8212;from the Copernican to the socialist revolutions&#8212;of this fight between Established Orthodoxy and upstart radicals over the “correct” way to interpret the world. Like Lutherans and their printing presses, the upstarts have often used new media technologies to spread their heterodox ideas. However, from the Copernicans to the Leninists, once the upstarts gained political ground, they also gained intellectual ground as they slowly captured the universities and ipso facto claimed status as the new established orthodoxies. However, on either side of revolution&#8212;and this is the key point&#8212;the university remained the space where “correct” interpretations of reality were manufactured. Who did the manufacturing was simply a matter of who controlled the universities.</p>
<p>What the Lutherans did with the printing press any number of heterodox outsiders&#8212;from Jordan Peterson to Richard Wolff and a whole host of non-academic intellectuals&#8212;are using digital media to replicate university discourse outside sanctioned universities, thereby challenging the academy’s monopoly on reality interpretation. These projects regularly interface with wider parts of online discourse outside of academia, such as Peterson’s appearances on Joe Rogan’s widely viewed interview show, or the lively blogosphere and social media discussion groups. Granted, an anti-college position is part and parcel of the blue collar ethos adopted by men like Rogan and other populist challengers to official interpretations.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2019/01/07/western-academias-activism-gridlock-threatens-its-status-as-challengers-rise/">as Wael Taji has noted</a>, the American university is becoming less attractive not only to people for whom it was never attractive in the first place, but also to potential scientists and intellectuals as well. Over the past fifty years, the capture of university departments by social activist professors—especially in the humanities and social sciences—has coincided seamlessly with the capture of university administration by corporate technocrats. More and more departments are restructuring their programs to address issues of race, class, and gender from an activist perspective; at the same time, universities have been eroding tenure and outsourcing labor to adjuncts or lecturers, who are paid less and given few or no benefits.</p>
<p>Both the accelerating default leftism of academia and the attrition of full-time faculty jobs have had an effect in driving some thinkers to adopt other means of exploring, expressing, and circulating their ideas&#8212;either by pursuing work in the rising Chinese academy, as in Taji’s case, or by abandoning academic life altogether, as in Jordan Peterson’s case. Either way, once bright minds start shunning the American academy and heading for alternative climes, it won’t take long for intellectual capital to sniff out the trend and begin flowing in another direction. It wouldn’t take long&#8212;perhaps no more than a generation or two&#8212;for the American university to lose its global standing as an incubator of scientific and intellectual talent.</p>
<p>For the Western university system to decline and crumble, its status as a status-manufacturer would need to decline first. Intellectually or scientifically ascendant outsiders, who have not just the desire but the ability to challenge academic orthodoxy, would need to deem other spaces of information exchange as the better pulpits from which to interpret reality—better, at any rate, than a graduate assistantship or a tenured chair at a university.</p>
<p>But those currently on the bleeding edge of university opposition are still fundamentally populists. They are not trying to set up an alternate center with higher intellectual quality, but are defined by their oppositional underdog act to the current center. The university will remain central as long as its would-be competitors continue to act through the vector of populist resentment, rather than an authoritative re-founding of those institutions which grant means and status. And if they did take that latter path, like past reforms, they would likely choose to capture the university, rather than sweep it away altogether.</p>
<p>If we see outsiders challenging and winning against academic orthodoxies but showing no interest in taking over the actual grounds and systems of the university, then and only then would the university as such be faced with its greatest existential threat&#8212;cultural irrelevance. But that is unlikely. Even in the most revolutionary scenarios, the gain from capturing the university will outweigh any desire to usurp its role. Much change is possible, in both form, scale, and content of the university system, but through it all, these great institutions will endure.</p>
<div class="author-bio">
<p class="author-description">Seth Largo holds degrees in linguistics and rhetoric. A native of Los Angeles’ suburban sprawl, he is now an English professor on the high plains.</p>
</div>The post <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2019/12/13/the-university-system-isnt-going-anywhere/">The University System Isn’t Going Anywhere
</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/">Palladium</a>.]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">2400</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>From Zacatecas to Mission Control: A Story of Assimilation and Its Future
</title>
		<link>https://www.palladiummag.com/2019/08/29/from-zacatecas-to-mission-control/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Seth Largo]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 Aug 2019 18:16:15 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.palladiummag.com/?p=2146</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Drawing on three generations of Mexican family history in America, Seth Largo tells a more nuanced and hopeful story on immigration and assimilation than current ideological narratives.</p>
The post <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2019/08/29/from-zacatecas-to-mission-control/"><b>From Zacatecas to Mission Control:</b> A Story of Assimilation and Its Future
</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/">Palladium</a>.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It’s the question sustaining the latest phase of immigration anxiety: will the Hispanics assimilate? Some people hope not. Some people dread they won’t. Regardless of ideology, it’s an interesting question because<a href="https://www.census.gov/newsroom/facts-for-features/2018/hispanic-heritage-month.html"> America has a lot of Hispanics</a>.</p>
<p>Hispanic is a loose term, encompassing everyone from Pope Francis to former Angels slugger Vladimir Guerrero (who is definitely “<a href="https://deadspin.com/black-hispanic-ballplayers-arent-black-enough-for-torii-5490095">not black</a>”), so I’m going to use the word Mexican. If I were from Manhattan, I would use Puerto Rican or Dominican. But I’m from southern California, so I’m going to use Mexican. Just as Asians and Pacific Islanders never consider themselves Asians and Pacific Islanders outside America, Hispanics are only Hispanics in the eyes of white census takers in Washington. There is no pan-Hispanic unity <i>al sur de la frontera</i> and only a tactical unity among the Latino diaspora in America. The question I began with&#8212;will Hispanics assimilate?&#8212;will be answered differently for each group. I can’t speak for the Dominicans or the Cubans. I can, however, shine a light on the Mexican-American experience. It is an anecdotal light, but my family can serve as a representative anecdote to the question of Mexican integration because it offers the benefit of generational hindsight&#8212;three generations, to be exact. Think of me as the grandson of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/04/politics/daca-dreamers-immigration-program/index.html">DREAMERS</a>, come back from the future to tell a more nuanced story about integration than almost anyone else is currently telling.</p>
<p>I must admit, America today is not the America encountered by my young grandparents, and my grandparents were perhaps nothing like the migrants now at the border. America today has changed and has different ideas about what it means to be American. Mexico has changed, too. These are valid points. However, Mexicans have been migrating northward in non-trivial numbers for a century now. It makes sense to look at past migrants and, importantly, at their descendants, because current anxieties are not just a response to the first generation, but to the fates of the second and third. When we ask whether or not an immigrant group will assimilate, we have a generational trend in mind.</p>
<p>Here, then, is one generational trend, revealed at the scale of an individual family. It begins with my grandfather’s family fleeing north from Zacatecas circa 1920, in flight from the horrors of the Mexican Revolution. My grandmother’s family hailed from Durango, escaping northward across the desert at the same time and for the same reason. Both families were <i>mestizo</i>, being of Spanish and indigenous ancestry, with all the shades of skin tone and gradations of phenotype that that ancestry suggests. At the Mexican consulate, a nameless government official printed the word <i>moreno</i>&#8212;brown&#8212;on the immigration card given to my great grandfather Martin Herrera.</p>
<p>The Herrera family settled in central California. My grandmother’s family (the Alvarez’s) settled in El Paso. Both families would eventually reach Los Angeles, where my grandparents would meet, wed, and start a family. But in both cases, their parents never assimilated to a white norm. They and their children had crossed the border legally, and by all accounts, they worked hard and stayed out of trouble. However, my grandmother’s parents never quite learned English, and my great-grandfather seems to have drifted from one menial factory job to another before succumbing to alcoholism in later years. Nevertheless, through intuition or carefully considered ideology, all my great-grandparents wanted their children to assimilate to Teddy Roosevelt’s Unhyphenated American ideal. They encouraged it, in part, by Anglicizing their children’s names not long after bringing them across the border. My mother’s aunt Esperanza, for example, became Hope. And a young boy named Raul became my grandfather Ralph.</p>
<p>As a child, Raul worked the fields near a central California nowheresville called Tehachapi. It’s what Tehachapi kids did: go to school and work the fields to make money for the family. It was a dusty, vaguely tolerable existence similar to the one profiled in <i>McFarland, USA</i>, the Disney film about Mexican farmhand kids turned cross country stars. At some point, the Herrera family relocated southward to Los Angeles, where Raul’s father Martin found work in a shoe factory. Life there was likely no more or less tolerable than it had been in Tehachapi.</p>
<p>In 1942, Raul (now Ralph) did what most young men did, regardless of race or class. He joined the military. World War II had as much to do with lifting immigrants out of generational poverty and assimilating them into a middle class existence as did the Immigration Act of 1924 (from which Mexicans were, ironically, exempt). Ralph Herrera left Los Angeles a poor young Mexican and returned four years later a war hero with valuable skills in aviation technology. He was stationed in the Pacific with the Army Air Corps, a navigator aboard a B-24 in the 90th Bomber Group. Shot down during combat. Earned multiple ribbons and awards, among them the Gold Star and the Philippine Liberation Medal. His was the lone Spanish surname among his crew, and one of the only Spanish surnames in the entire 90th Bomber Group. Was he the butt of ethnic ribbing? I’m sure. I cannot speak to Ralph Herrera’s experiences of casual racism in the Army Air Corps because he never talked service to his grandchildren. He attended gatherings of the 90th veterans later in life, so the ribbing was obviously outweighed by the shared experience of near death. All I know is that my grandfather’s military service was crucial to the trajectory his life would take after the war.</p>
<p>When he returned to California, Ralph married Emma Alvarez and parlayed his newly minted aviation knowledge into a job as an electrical technician with Rockwell International. Ralph obviously knew his stuff because by the 1960s, he was supporting a large family (eight kids) as a Rockwell contractor on the Apollo missions. He would have been one of the contract men hanging around mission control in Houston, ensuring all the Rockwell components worked correctly.</p>
<p>In 1965, Ralph received a letter from the Apollo astronauts, thanking him for his service. It’s quite a thing to look at, for me personally, of course, but also in light of the simmering distrust that has arisen today between whites and Mexicans. It wasn’t always this way. Here at the end of the Jim Crow era, we find an Armstrong, an Aldrin, and a Grissom thanking a Herrera from Compton for his contribution to the space program&#8212;no hidden figure but a valued member of the whitest team ever assembled. From Zacatecas to mission control in one generation.</p>
<figure id="attachment_2151" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-2151" style="width: 683px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="wp-image-2151 size-full" src="https://pdmedia.b-cdn.net/2019/08/largo.jpg" alt="" width="683" height="907" data-wp-pid="2151" srcset="https://pdmedia.b-cdn.net/2019/08/largo-226x300.jpg 226w, https://pdmedia.b-cdn.net/2019/08/largo-450x598.jpg 450w, https://pdmedia.b-cdn.net/2019/08/largo-452x600.jpg 452w, https://pdmedia.b-cdn.net/2019/08/largo.jpg 683w" sizes="(max-width: 683px) 100vw, 683px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-2151" class="wp-caption-text">Seth Largo/NASA Apollo letter from 1965</figcaption></figure>
<p>According to my mother, Spanish was strictly forbidden in the home. My oldest uncle got some of it, but by the time my mother was born, the Herrera household was an English-only household. If you didn’t speak English, you were sent to a Mexican school, so Ralph and Emma relegated Spanish to late night fights over money. With the kids, it was all English all the time. Their parents struggled with or never learned the de facto American language, but their children spoke like newscasters. When it came time for my mother to mark an ethnicity on job applications in the 1970s, she eschewed the new HISPANIC designation (she didn’t speak Spanish, after all) and wrote “Human Being” instead.</p>
<p>Whether or not the cadences of perfect Los Angeles English had anything to do with this next anecdotal fact, I am unsure, but my mother and her siblings&#8212;all seven of them&#8212;married whites. South Los Angeles in the 1960s and 70s was still majority white, but Mexican communities existed, and it was not impossible to stay insular. My grandparents did not stay insular. The Herrera family was the only Mexican family on the block, according to my mother, and while she had her flings with the occasional greaser, it was a green-eyed surfer who ultimately caught her eye and won her hand. My father is only half Irish, but that didn’t stop some of the Mexican girls at school from calling my mother a “paddy lover.” Did my aunts and uncles get similar treatment? I’m sure it was good-natured, but even if it was an attempt to keep the <i>mestizos</i> away from the <i>gringos</i>, not a single Herrera married a Rodriguez, a Garcia, or a Gonzalez. They married Donahues and Edmondsons instead. Los Angeles was the melting pot metaphor in action.</p>
<p>As to politics, I know little about the affiliations of my great-grandparents, or even of my grandparents. Insofar as the question here is one of assimilation, it matters little if the Herrera/Alvarez clan voted Democrat or Republican in the middle twentieth century because the distinction meant something different from what it does today. The fact pertinent to the assimilation question is that, in 2019, my mother and her siblings are either apolitical or Republicans. In 2016, at the height of racial tension between whites and Hispanics, these <i>mestizo</i> sons and daughters of Mexican immigrants either did not vote, or voted for Trump. To be sure, they remain Spanish Catholics at heart, so you can’t begrudge my maternal family a heart for the poor and a preference for a social safety net. An uncle is heavily involved in poverty ministries. One of my mother’s cousins runs a religiously affiliated orphanage in Baja, California. However, these are law-and-order Catholics who have no time for <i>la raza</i> politics or illegal immigration. Their parents and grandparents came legally&#8212;even during a time of great violence.</p>
<p>To sum up the trajectory: day laboring immigrants flee Mexico and cross the border circa 1920, their son becomes a war hero and NASA contractor, and their granddaughter grows up a California girl who marries a white surfer. Their son&#8212;the great-grandson of those Mexicans in flight from the revolution&#8212;is a white English professor who at this moment is sipping La Croix and listening to EDM. Hair and eyes a couple shades darker than the typical Anglo brunette, as well as a complete inability to grow a beard, are the only signs that he has any indigenous ancestry whatsoever (just under 20%, according to the test). In short, my maternal family’s story is a story of American assimilation <i>par excellence</i>.</p>
<p>I have no doubt that the Herrera and Alvarez families faced some discrimination in their new country. Nevertheless, the family was and remains patriotic and committed to adopting the norms of the country that adopted them.</p>
<p>My family’s story scores a point for those who argue that Mexicans (and Hispanics in general) will assimilate into American life as did the Italians and Poles before them. Of course, my family’s story also has the benefit of generational hindsight. I imagine Martin Herrera and his brood looked much the same in the eyes of 1930s Anglos as do the migrants crossing the border today: unskilled, unversed in English, poor, and brown-skinned. Would the Anglos of an earlier America had softened their glare if they’d known that one of Martin’s sons would fight the Japanese and contribute to the Apollo missions? Would they have softened their glare if they had known that Martin’s granddaughter would intermarry and vote Republican? If today’s Trump voters could be assured that the migrants’ children and grandchildren would grow into Unhyphenated Americans, would they take a softer view of immigration?</p>
<p>I like to think so. To reiterate my earlier point, a major component of immigration anxiety is a concern about the second and third generations. Americans don’t expect the first (adult) generation to learn English or ever <i>feel</i> American. Most first generation Mexicans, like most first generation groups, keep their heads down, work hard, and stay out of trouble anyway. It’s when their children and grandchildren join gangs, speak Spanish, and sport shirts with the Mexican flag that Americans start to get worried.</p>
<p>Do I have anyone like that in my extended maternal family? Here is where I must pivot, mark an asterisk, and admit that my grandfather’s and grandmother’s story is not the only Herrera/Alvarez story. The siblings of my grandparents bore other children who did not marry gringos, who bore instead a third generation of children whose lives look nothing like mine. My mother’s aunts, uncles, and cousins are mostly a foreign territory to me. When I see them at family functions (most recently, at my grandparents’ funerals), it’s hard to believe we are related. They aren’t <i>la raza</i> activists or cartel <i>sicarios</i>, but whereas I am a largely white Unhyphenated American, they remain undoubtedly Mexican-Americans. That’s not to say they’re poor. There is much non-poverty among southern California’s Mexican-American community. Some are working class. Many have scraped their way into California’s middle class (which, by national standards, is pretty economically well-off). But they seem to exist in a separate world, regardless of the particularities of their class status.</p>
<p>I would provide details about that side of the Herrera/Alvarez story, but I know no details. Out of what can only be called a sense of ethnic shame, my mother did not bring me around her aunts, uncles, cousins, or cousins’ kids very often. They are the Mexican-Americans. We are the Unhyphenated Americans. And the latter have been on a very different trajectory from the former. Mexicans like my mother and her siblings verify the “Mexicans are the new Italians” thesis. They married into the Anglo population, as have their children. They happily adopted the values and culture of the imagined American norm. They even adopted the values of a conservative version of that norm. The Spanish language has vanished from their homes. Tamales at Christmas are the last ethnic remnant. They vote Republican. They live in the suburbs. Their children call themselves Mexican only when it suits their interests.</p>
<p>Among the Mexican-Americans, however, the Spanish language has not entirely vanished. Many ethnic vestiges remain. They live a more urban existence. They marry within the Mexican-American community. And while I don’t know their politics, I doubt any of them voted Republican. There is a range of class statuses, to be sure, among all branches of my maternal family (families are always rising and falling in America), but the latest generation on the Mexican-American side seems to lack the full cultural and motivational resources gifted to me, my cousins, my nephews and nieces through our grandparents’ staunch insistence on American assimilation.</p>
<p>I cast no judgment on one trajectory or the other. But if the question of the day is whether or not Hispanics will assimilate, I can report as a descriptive matter that, after three generations, a divide does exist in my family between the Unhyphenated Americans and the Mexican-Americans. Interestingly, some of the poorer Unhyphenated American males have married Latinas, and their children have trended back into the Mexican-American trajectory. The reality is, marrying outside or within the ethnicity seems to be the defining characteristic that separates the Unhyphenated from the Mexican-American.</p>
<p>However, race isn’t everything when it comes to Mexican integration. That would be too simple. Brownness is much more fluid than blackness in America’s racial landscape, in part because Mexicans are already a <i>mestizo</i> population: part indigenous, part Spanish, with a spattering of African ancestry. At either end of the population distribution, one finds a few <i>puros indios</i> and a few true <i>castizos</i>, but the majority of Mexicans fall between a <a href="http://dienekes.blogspot.com/2008/09/genomic-ancestry-of-mexicans.html">60/40 and a 40/60 split</a> in indigenous and Southern European ancestry. Skin color and facial features do interesting things in such an admixed group. Critics enjoy calling out the whiteness of <i>telenovela</i> actors, but these white casts almost certainly possess a non-trivial amount of indigenous ancestry. A dark day laborer could very well trace half his ancestry to Cortez. Unlike in African-Americans, there is no one-to-one correspondence in Hispanics between skin tone and oppressed ancestry. Hispanics challenge that core assumption of American race politics. In many Mexican families (including my mother’s), a swarthy son can be seen playing alongside a fair sister. While my mother could have passed as Greek or Italian in her youth, her brothers did and still do “look Mexican.” Regardless of looks, they all married whites, and all their children now identify as white. The lesson I take is that, regardless of looks, one generation is all it takes for Mexicans to marry into whiteness. There is no real sense in which I am “mixed.” Had my mother been black instead of <i>mestizo</i>, that would be a different matter.</p>
<p>If “looking Mexican” is not reliably indicative of one’s degree of indigenous ancestry, neither is it necessarily indicative of ideology and politics. Half the <i>la raza</i> activists on television and in academic departments are fair-skinned, Jorge Ramos being the most prominent example. (Of course, their activism might indicate assimilation to left-leaning American norms, but as a rule, when we speak about assimilation, we typically mean assimilation to a moderate or apolitical American sensibility.)</p>
<p>To illustrate the asymmetry between skin tone and ideology, we can look to California’s 35th Congressional District, where my parents reside. Stretching from the eastern Los Angeles suburbs into the heart of the<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inland_Empire"> Inland Empire</a>, the district is 70% Hispanic and only 15% non-Hispanic white. In 2018, <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/California%27s_35th_Congressional_District_election,_2018">this congressional race</a> was, expectedly, between two Hispanics: the incumbent Norma Torres (D) and the challenger Christian Valiente (R). Torres is what you’d expect a California Democrat to be: left-leaning on nearly every issue and non-committal on ones that don’t matter to the activist base. Christian Valiente, in contrast to the incumbent Torres, ran on an explicitly conservative platform of “faith, family, freedom.” His defunct campaign website sported a quote from Milton Friedman on the homepage. <a href="https://www.facebook.com/clvaliente4/">His Facebook page</a> lists the following characteristics: Conservative, Non-Establishment, Army Veteran, Small Business Owner, Entrepreneur, Family Man, Man of Faith. As to Torres and Valiente themselves, I’ll let the reader decide whether or not, in this case, “looking Hispanic” correlates with political ideology.</p>
<p>In their election contest, Torres won handily, winning 70% of the vote to Valiente’s 30%. However, in a district that is only 15% white (many of whom are California liberals), the fact that a “faith, family, freedom” candidate garnered 30% of the vote is interesting. Valiente’s 30% is comparable to Donald Trump’s capture of 28% of the national Hispanic vote. This is double the rate at which African-Americans vote rightward; Republicans have plateaued in perpetuity at 10% of the black vote. Reagan and W. Bush captured 30-40% of the Hispanic vote, higher still, so the fact that Donald Trump managed to win 28% of Hispanics indicates that 28% is probably rock bottom when it comes to Hispanics’ penchant for far-right candidates. Unlike the African-American voting trend, these numbers do not indicate a stable racial voting bloc. Indeed, Hispanic presidential voting trends have wavered across the map since 1980, with Democrats capturing only 60% of their votes in some years and upwards of 80% in other years.</p>
<p>For the time being, the numbers above provide only a rough sketch of the socio-political context in which my maternal family’s divide exists. Do the Unhyphenated Americans in my family represent, to an approximation, that 30% of Hispanics who have adopted the traditional, white American ethos, who have in fact married explicitly into that ethos? Do the Mexican-Americans in my family represent the other 70% who, while more conservative than white liberals in matters of gender or sexuality, nevertheless continue to see value in an ideology of racial or cultural separateness?</p>
<p>Perhaps, perhaps not. But if my own family, after three generations, cannot present a picture of total integration across all its branches, then we can expect the cultural divide to continue at large. The divide will be emphasized as long as we have a steady stream of immigrants coming in across the southern border. A regular supply of Hispanics makes it easier for Hispanics to maintain a distinctive identity, and, above all, to intermarry within the Hispanic community. Some of the new arrivals will certainly follow the path my grandparents followed, but not all or even most of them. Wary whites will continue to be more threatened by Mexican-American pride days than by St. Patrick’s Day.</p>
<p>However, alongside the cultural divide, economic integration will continue apace. I noted that there is much non-poverty among my Mexican-American family, regardless of cultural assimilation or willingness to marry into whiteness. After three generations, the Herrera/Alvarez clan can claim a solid degree of economic success. Most data indicate that<a href="https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/02/hispanic-poverty-rate-hit-an-all-time-low-in-2017.html"> Hispanics do well enough in the long run</a>, and that Mexico’s policy of poverty exportation exacerbates what is otherwise an economic success story. Across the southwest, you will find recently arrived Mexican adults cleaning dishes and serving fast food, but you will also find second and third generation Mexican-Americans running restaurants, teaching high school, joining police departments, working as contractors, mechanics, and welders. This community of economically but not quite culturally assimilated Mexican-Americans will define the next century of America’s demographic evolution. Whether it will form a separate nation within America, or simply come to define the new, slightly browner face of America, depends on institutional factors.</p>
<p>Drawing on my grandfather’s pivotal experiences, the question can be put like this: will today’s Mexican immigrant children grow up and join the equivalent of the military and NASA, or will they, by lack of such opportunities or deliberate choice, maintain a separate Mexican-American existence as part of America’s cultural mosaic? The story doesn’t end with the statistics on assimilation. The statistics are just a consequence of an underlying reality of available institutional paths, and even deliberate policy.</p>
<p>When my grandparents were choosing to assimilate themselves and their children, American culture at large had a negative association with hyphenated Americans, and for better or worse, put forth an unhyphenated ideal to help with the challenges of a previous generation of mass immigration. Through the war effort and later Cold War and NASA activities, Americans, hyphenated or not, had opportunities to integrate themselves into the core collective development efforts of the country. Those collective development efforts have since mostly ceased, and the ideal of the Unhyphenated American has faded into the background.</p>
<p>Assimilation depends on the larger question of whether the nation has a robust machinery of collective existence. Either way, the story of future assimilation isn’t really about Mexican-Americans. It’s about what kind of thing America is and will be, and what kind of people it will create.</p>
<div class="author-bio">
<p class="author-description">Seth Largo holds degrees in linguistics and rhetoric. A native of Los Angeles’ suburban sprawl, he is now an English professor on the high plains.</p>
</div>The post <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2019/08/29/from-zacatecas-to-mission-control/"><b>From Zacatecas to Mission Control:</b> A Story of Assimilation and Its Future
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