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	<title>Vincent Garton, Author at Palladium</title>
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	<title>Vincent Garton, Author at Palladium</title>
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		<title>Singapore Is Failing at Digital Sovereignty
</title>
		<link>https://www.palladiummag.com/2020/06/24/singapore-is-failing-at-digital-sovereignty/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Vincent Garton]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2020 21:07:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Singapore has been held up as a model of governance. But with American political culture threatening its institutions, China's digital sovereignty may be the strategy that endures.</p>
The post <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2020/06/24/singapore-is-failing-at-digital-sovereignty/">Singapore Is Failing at Digital Sovereignty
</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/">Palladium</a>.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The intensifying geopolitical competition between China and the United States has sounded the death knell for liberal hopes of a transparent and unified internet. These aspirations have warped and disintegrated beneath the shadow of the “<a href="https://techcrunch.com/2019/03/13/the-splinternet-is-already-here/">Splinternet</a>”&#8212;a fragmentation of the global internet into autonomous American, Chinese, Russian, and other spheres. Though the West has grown resigned to the prospect of a hegemonic and heavily censored Chinese internet within China’s own national territory, the internet’s global “marketplace of ideas” remains the object of maudlin lamentation as a casualty of the spiraling U.S.-China cold war.</p>
<p>The erection of this Iron Curtain in cyberspace, <a href="https://www.economist.com/international/2016/11/05/lost-in-the-splinternet" class="broken_link">we are told</a>, has diminished opportunities for transnational collaboration in a variety of productive spheres, ranging from cultural exchange to scientific research, excluding both the American and Chinese sides from the win-win dynamics of a free and open internet. Left unquestioned in this is the premise that the uncensored Western internet has served as a neutral platform for the unmitigated intercourse of ideas and networks.</p>
<p>Influential American geopolitical strategists such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13439000220141596" class="broken_link">Joseph Nye </a>have <a href="http://marginallyproductive.com/2020/06/03/were-all-living-in-america/">frequently observed</a> that the U.S. dominance of the internet constitutes a key pillar of American cultural hegemony abroad. This appears validated by Western Europe, which, above all, has fallen ever more under the sway of American political discourse. Even in countries culturally positioned outside the West such as India, prolonged exposure to the Western internet is increasingly <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/a-changing-india-caught-between-illiberalism-and-social-revolution/" class="broken_link">eroding traditional cultural norms</a>. Although this has <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/a-changing-india-caught-between-illiberalism-and-social-revolution/" class="broken_link">not yet extended</a> to influencing Indian politics, international familiarity with the distinctly American brand of liberal politics underscores the Internet’s instrumental role in exporting its publicity&#8212;putting in question the internet’s intrinsic neutrality.</p>
<p>The active role of the American-dominated internet in radiating this particular form of liberal politics across the world bears profound implications for the global future of governance. It raises fundamental questions as to whether a country should find it desirable to remain open to the Western internet today.</p>
<p>The trade-off involved is best illustrated in a comparative examination of Singapore and China. Both countries are highly technocratic states with formidable capacities for mobilization and, from the perspective of many Westerners, enviably functional governance structures. Singapore’s cyberspace is practically constituted and engulfed by the American internet, while China has retained and consolidated “cybersovereignty” over a distinctive internet culture.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">***</p>
<p>The West is undoubtedly the dominant cultural influence in virtually all aspects of Singaporean life across social classes, especially for the governing elite&#8212;a trend that shows no signs of abating. The most conspicuous instance is linguistic hegemony; proficiency in English is viewed as the principal arbiter of social status and English <a href="https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/more-local-chinese-speaking-english-their-main-language-singapore-losing-bilingual-edge-pm" class="broken_link">continues to cannibalize</a> other local languages in spoken frequency among youth, like Mandarin, Malay, and Tamil. This also means Singaporeans rarely browse the Chinese internet, excluding mainland China from Singapore’s cultural relevance. Among the elites, this manifests itself in the constant use of Western countries as benchmarks or referential comparisons for justifying new policy frameworks. Collectively, this enshrines a Singapore plugged firmly into the American internet, but not the Chinese one.</p>
<p>Although Singapore does censor the internet, it does so in light-touch fashion. Almost all dissident political websites are permitted, and access to foreign media sites is unrestricted. To the extent online political restrictions exist, they take two forms. First, the government imposes heavy, one-off registration fees for the mandatory licensing of online political sites. These licensing terms commit political sites to remove content flagged by the state as subverting political stability within 24 hours.</p>
<p>Though this appears as a potential pretext for heavy restrictions on online content, the Singaporean state in practice limits its use to explicit racial or religious hate speech. The one-off nature of the fee has also not deterred the emergence of multiple alternative news sites, such as <a href="https://mothership.sg/">Mothership</a> and the <a href="https://www.onlinecitizenasia.com/">Online Citizen</a>. Second, originators of online statements that are flagged as factually untrue must accompany the post with a government notice clarifying why the statement was factually untrue. However, this falls short of removing the post and applies to transparently false claims, rather than statements of opinion.</p>
<p>This combination of openness to the West and retention of illiberal technocratic management is widely seen as a major advantage of Singapore’s governing model. The former allows Singapore to access the West’s scientific and cultural know-how, while the latter ensures policy can be implemented efficiently without partisan obstruction and in a long-term manner. Indeed, in light of America’s <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2020/05/21/institutional-failures-give-us-no-choice-but-herd-immunity/">catastrophic</a> governmental response to the coronavirus, Singapore is increasingly cited approvingly as an example of a competent state that still tolerates Western institutional norms&#8212;thus proof the West need not emulate China in designing a credible alternative governance model.</p>
<p>However, this presupposes a monolithic and static Singapore model, meticulously selecting the best aspects of the West to emulate. It ignores a recent transformational shift which has only accelerated due to deep exposure to the Western internet: the ascent of “identity politics” in Singapore. If sufficiently proliferated, it would pose a new, yet undiscussed challenge to the sustainability of Singapore’s governance model.</p>
<p>Singapore is a <a href="https://www.strategygroup.gov.sg/files/media-centre/publications/population-in-brief-2019.pdf" class="broken_link">multiracial country</a>, with ethnic Chinese forming the dominant demographic majority (76% by the 2019 census), the Malays forming a sizable minority (15%), and a smaller Indian community forming most of the rest (7.5%). A guiding principle for the Singapore state’s administration of multiethnic relations is racial harmony. This prohibits structural discrimination on racial or religious grounds. It is also a severe criminal offense to make derogatory comments about other races or religions. This has been credited with preventing racial and religious strife that have consumed other small states like Lebanon or Sri Lanka.</p>
<p>However, this state-imposed vision of racial and religious harmony is largely freedom <i>from </i>racial and religious discrimination, rather than freedom <i>to</i> actively forge a collective identity that transcends race and religion while still accommodating cultural differences. This is manifest in the Singaporean state’s reliance on top-down mechanisms to enforce this policy&#8212;notably, in the primary use of legal sanctions against racially sensitive activity, and in the deliberate allocation of public housing to ensure multiethnic compositions in housing estates.</p>
<p>One consequence of this “freedom from” top-down approach is the<a href="https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/race-issues-get-airing-local-tv-documentary" class="broken_link"> persistence of racial stereotypes</a> across Singapore’s racial groups. For example, Singapore’s Malay community may be stereotyped by the Chinese as “lazy,” while the Malays may reciprocate with labels of “intimidating” and “bossy.” These sentiments are only compounded by Singapore’s high level of income inequality and status anxiety.</p>
<p>This setup has fomented a growing constituency of primarily younger Singaporeans who believe the discourse of American liberal politics finds a direct parallel in Singapore’s domestic situation. Unashamed borrowing of the terminology is evident. For example, the term “Chinese privilege,” derived from the Anglo-American concept of “white privilege” and used to describe the advantages enjoyed by the politically and economically dominant Chinese community, has proven ubiquitous enough to become the central theme of articles in the <a href="https://rafflespress.com/2018/07/21/on-racism-and-chinese-privilege/">student newspaper</a> of the Raffles Institution, one of Singapore’s leading schools.</p>
<p>The Singaporean government’s “meritocratic” approach to scholarship issuance and the prevalence of racial stereotyping by numerically dominant Chinese employers are cited as instances of “institutional discrimination” favoring the Chinese community. Following another feature of Western discourse, crude instances of stereotyping of Malays and Indians by Singaporean-Chinese have become analyzed as “microaggressions.” Such sentiment is not merely confined to online discourse, but has exploded onto the national spotlight.</p>
<p>One incident from August 2019 is instructive. A racially insensitive advertisement where a Chinese actor painted his face brown to play the role of an Indian provoked a Singaporean-Indian couple’s infuriated video response where they explicitly accused the Chinese community of racism and insulted them with profanities. The Singaporean government responded disproportionately to the latter, viewing the former as an insensitive yet accidental <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/mediacorp-apologises-after-ad-stirs-debate-about-depictions-of-race">mistake</a> but the latter as a <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/allowing-offensive-rap-video-calling-out-brownface-would-worsen-racism-shanmugam">direct threat</a> to racial harmony. An intense public backlash at this perceived ‘double standard’ ensued, especially from liberal voices, prompting repeated ministerial statements to clarify the <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/education/controversy-over-brownface-ad-shows-need-to-err-on-side-of-caution-grace-fu">government’s position </a>and calm public anger.</p>
<p>Another example is online anger at a recently circulated Facebook image of some Chinese students celebrating an Indian classmate’s birthday with their faces painted black. In a Singaporean context, such actions have little of their deep historical resonance in America. And yet, they have taken on heightened significance with the increasing penetration of Singaporean discourse by American liberalism. In the latter case, the resulting outcry was sufficiently severe to prompt an <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/racially-insensitive-acts-not-condoned-but-singapore-and-us-situations-are-different-ong-ye">appeal for calm</a> from the Education Minister. These examples illustrate the growing contrast between the state’s vision of racial harmony and the viewpoint of the imported liberal politics: while the former has strictly regulated explicitly racist behavior while giving ambiguous cases the benefit of the doubt, the latter tends to view such ambiguities as “microaggressions.”</p>
<p>Given the official ban on polling in Singapore, hard empirical data on the exact demographic of this emergent liberal politics is difficult to ascertain. However, the movement’s disproportionate representation in forums such as Reddit and in online sites with an explicitly millennial base such as<a href="https://zula.sg/chinese-singapore-racist/"> Zula</a> and <a href="https://www.ricemedia.co/current-affairs-opinion-sap-schools-chinese-elitism-singapore/">Rice Media</a> intimates both its roots in the American internet and the demographic’s youthful and highly-educated slant across all races, including&#8212;if not especially&#8212;among ethnic Chinese. This is further confirmed by the <a href="https://www.nlb.gov.sg/golibrary2/e/singapore-literature-book-club-malay-sketches-by-alfian-saat-90623797" class="broken_link">recent popularity</a> of Singapore poet Alfian Sa’at’s writings on racial identity in Singapore, including among government scholars studying at Western universities. The coincidence of public anger at the scandals mentioned above with the George Floyd protests and even the Education Minister’s explicit appeal for enraged netizens to bear in mind<a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/racially-insensitive-acts-not-condoned-but-singapore-and-us-situations-are-different-ong-ye"> differences</a> between the American and Singaporean racial situation only further underscore the contagious and imitative role of the American internet.</p>
<p>This straightforward importation of Western liberal politics into Singapore should be taken seriously as a <i>political trend </i>with disruptive potential for its governance. Whatever one thinks of the positions involved here, the rising challenge is not compatible with Singapore’s governance model.</p>
<p>Some have seen in the Singaporean governance model a simultaneously inclusive and technocratic state apparatus. The technocratic elite derives expertise on “appropriate” policy by leveraging powerful state organs to consult social stakeholders and gauge public sentiment. This forms the “inclusivity” aspect. In tandem with consultation, the technocratic class evaluates public sentiment in relation to their worldview and analysis of the conjuncture. These factors jointly influence eventual policy decisions that are imposed top-down. This forms the “technocratic” aspect. This purportedly ensures astute decisiveness in policy-making while still leaving room for public opinion. More importantly, the ability of the state to set the parameters of discourse in civil society develops a consciousness among individuals and consulted stakeholders of where their interests and roles stand in the broader national interest. This expedites trust and co-operation with the state in policy implementation.</p>
<p>However, the importation of Western liberal politics has introduced two novelties to Singaporean discourse that undermine this approach that renders American cultural influence problematic for the sustainability of Singaporean governance.</p>
<p>First, the particularist strand in this import of liberal politics is evident: the “problem” identified is the existence of institutional discrimination against racial minorities and the minority’s sense of exclusion from mainstream society. The chief issue is thus <i>distributional</i>: how to redistribute social currencies&#8212;prestige, jobs, scholarships, and the like&#8212;toward racial minorities and away from an envisaged “privileged” caste. By defining the mode of political engagement as advocacy for the interests of a specific community, politics is framed as a perpetual clash of competing partisan groups defined along racial lines.</p>
<p>Encouraging stakeholders to constitute themselves as partisan agents extracting concessions from an institutionalized state subverts the Singaporean state’s ability to effect lasting compromise among contesting interests. Since the state by construction serves the established interests from which redistribution is sought, this mode of liberal politics refuses to accept the <i>sine qua non </i>of the Singapore model: the technocratic state’s monopoly on discourse production. Collectively, this entails the disintegration of Singapore’s technocratic politics into a politics polarized along identity lines.</p>
<p>This culminates in emulation of Western political dysfunctionality.</p>
<p>Second, a bizarre paradox lies at the heart of Singapore’s imported variant of liberal politics: although racism is framed as a structural problem, not even an attempt at structural reform is suggested as a prescription. Instead, the solution is framed as the privileged individual’s imperative to reflect on their discrimination. The “solution” is thus explicitly addressed to privileged groups, including governing elites, exhorting endless individual introspection and even guilt at being on the favored side of the institutional setup. Though there is nothing problematic in the occasional reminder to account for racial sensitivities in individual conduct, liberal politics positions itself as a recurrent political demand for the privileged to apologize for institutional inequities.</p>
<p>This perspective thus encourages governing elites to dismiss institutional reform to mitigate racism as necessarily impotent and normalizes distrust in the very institutions they manage for perpetuating inequities. This is transparently a recipe for eternal political paralysis as the governing class avoids responsibility for governance by guilt at even engaging with the state institutions under their control. Given the Singaporean model’s inordinate reliance on technocratic instruction, paralysis at the top would prove especially fatal. The popularity of imported liberal politics among Singapore’s current scholars, its future civil servants, a trend amplified both by their <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2019/08/05/the-real-problem-at-yale-is-not-free-speech/">studies at Western universities</a> and heavy use of the American internet, renders this prospect plausible.</p>
<p>The question of the sustainability of the Singaporean model in view of the accelerated import, facilitated by the internet, of the American style of identity politics. In America itself, this style has already demonstrably paralysed governance and distracted elites from deeper material problems such as economic stagnation and deepening income inequality. This throws into question Singapore’s status as a plausible exemplar for integrating the advantages and avoiding the pitfalls of both Chinese authoritarianism and Western liberal democracy. Those who see in Singapore a panacea for American political dysfunctionality should first bear in mind the more pertinent risk of Singapore’s increasing imitation of American political partisanship. With the West increasingly riven by political fragmentation, openness to the imitative potential&#8212;the mimesis&#8212;of the Western internet is more a liability than an asset for governance. A contrast can be found in the case of China itself.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">***</p>
<p>For many people, both in and outside of China, the reason that China censors its internet has seemed obvious: to suppress the emergence of threats to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This is true as far as it goes. Yet under Xi Jinping, China’s regulation of the internet has been systematized further and given theoretical articulation under the moniker of “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/03/world/asia/china-internet-censorship-wang-huning.html">cybersovereignty</a>,” and the objectives and effects of this project go beyond the mere elimination of political competition. At the simplest level, it indicates the territorialization of cyberspace: the segmenting of the internet into autonomous sovereign spaces. To understand the scope of the divergence of China’s public sphere from that of a country like Singapore, however, it is necessary to consider the objectives and effects of this doctrine in more detail.</p>
<p>A 2019 article by Zhang Xu and Liu Yangyue&#8212;a political scientist at China’s National University of Defense Technology who has specialized in comparing the dynamics of internet control across different countries&#8212;<a href="http://www.cssn.cn/gjgxx/gj_ttxw/201911/t20191113_5034091.shtml" class="broken_link">instructively outlines</a> the central problems that the policy of cybersovereignty is intended to resolve. Among these they enumerate the intrinsic disorder of the internet and its facilitation of political irresponsibility&#8212;items that may appear as so many generic authoritarian complaints in response to a space of free and unfettered discourse. Yet they highlight two other characteristics that are harder to dismiss: first, the unequal distribution of power built into the global infrastructure and governance of the internet; second, the tendency of cyberspace towards cultural homogeneity.</p>
<p>In respect of the broader goals of China’s internet policy, this last observation may be the most relevant point. “Cyberspace,” Zhang and Liu argue, citing Adorno and Horkheimer’s theory of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture_industry">culture industry</a>, is a favorable “environment for the expansion of cultural imperialism.” The dominant characteristic of online social media, they note, is the use of American social media platforms by non-American users. The ostensible neutrality and freedom of cyberspace has become merely the vector of an all-encompassing American cultural hegemony. To some degree, the Singaporean case might justify this view.</p>
<p>In effect, China’s response to this problem has been the guided and intensive cultivation of a domestic online culture industry unbeholden to Western concerns. Though competitive domestic alternatives to the Western social media giants have emerged in many countries&#8212;Naver in South Korea and VK in Russia&#8212;from its fortified position behind the Great Firewall, China has attained a degree of influence and variety in its homegrown social media that is unique outside the West. The comprehensive and carefully regulated ecosystem of networks such as <a href="https://www.weibo.com/">Weibo</a> and <a href="https://wx.qq.com/">Weixin</a>, together with forums such as <a href="https://www.zhihu.com/">Zhihu</a>, represents a total discursive space that has proven relatively impervious to the currents emanating from the internal convulsions of American culture&#8212;unlike the Singaporean internet. Moreover, as the growth of TikTok in Western markets attests, Chinese platforms may now cast shadows that extend far beyond China itself.</p>
<p>As with the selective imposition of tariffs on physical goods, this aspect of cybersovereignty as an <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2020/06/15/the-economic-foundations-of-industrial-policy/">industrial policy</a> of the public sphere, a project that combines the cultivation of flagship social media platforms with intentional cultural engineering, would not be possible at such scale without the selective exclusion of dominant foreign alternatives. This exclusion is by no means hermetic. Mainland Chinese users of Western social media, though Westerners typically dislike their opinions, are not simply “bots” sponsored by the CCP: the use of VPNs to access Western websites like Twitter is endemic and shows little sign of disappearance despite its formal illegality and periodic, often localized crackdowns by the Chinese government. It is not difficult to find mainland Chinese users on Western social media. What is far less frequent, however, is for the cultural worldview of such users to be shaped fundamentally by their access to these foreign platforms. In that respect, the policy of hindering access without complete exclusion has done its work.</p>
<p>There is more to say about China’s “authoritarian” concern with the apparent intrinsic disorder of the internet. One of the most penetrating historians of Soviet culture, Boris Groys, has <a href="https://platypus1917.org/2013/03/01/remembrance-of-things-past-an-interview-with-boris-groys/">described</a> the regulation of public discourse under the Soviet Union through the historical context of the collapse of the Enlightenment ideal of arriving at social progress through a process of reasoned debate in the public sphere. The experience of the long 19th century had demonstrated that, left to its own devices, public discourse must inextricably be riven by the conflict of irreconcilable views and value systems.</p>
<p>The Stalinist cultural apparatus constituted the administration of a state of collapse in the public sphere in which the liberal desire to approach the truth through argument and reconciliation had failed&#8212;and, in Soviet eyes, had always been doomed to failure. The Soviet Union has remained an instructive example for Chinese policymakers, especially under Xi Jinping. In the context of both the internal critique of “historical nihilism” that has motivated Xi’s cultural policy from the <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2019/05/31/xi-jinping-in-translation-chinas-guiding-ideology/">beginning of his chairmanship</a> and, externally, the apparent collapse of public discourse in the West, Xi’s focus on internet regulation may well be read in a very similar light.</p>
<p>The contradictions of China’s own development, above all between reform-and-opening and the self-insistent continuation of the Leninist state, have themselves produced discursive divergences that cannot simply resolve themselves through reasoned argument. Some of the broad and ultimately irreconcilable viewpoints generated by these different moments of development were <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20200402140038/www.readingthechinadream.com/jiang-shigong-philosophy-and-history.html">summarized</a> by the Beijing theorist Jiang Shigong in 2018: the desire for China’s transformation into a liberal democratic state on Western lines, the appeal to Confucian antiquity as a basis for the reconstruction of the CCP, and so on.</p>
<p>In the context of an intensifying competition between fundamentally divergent worldviews, Jiang’s argument suggests, the political development of the public sphere must be subject to an ultimate Schmittian decision that clarifies the goals and limits of acceptable discourse. As the West’s own experience has shown, in cyberspace such points of tension have the potential for limitless amplification. Yet the intrinsic network openness of the internet will not simply disappear. The only option&#8212;so it appears to China&#8212;is a recognition that this process of discursive collapse will happen, and that it must be kept in check by a continual process of public intervention aiming to maintain its contradictions within the limits, and perhaps for the benefit, of a certain common good.</p>
<p>That this is best considered as the promotion of autonomous culture and the suspension of its contradictions rather than its totalitarian regimentation is shown by the fact that within this partially closed ecosystem an apparently strange vitality of political discourse has been sustained. China has developed its own quite distinctive corners of policy debate and theory on its internet, schools of opinion such as the<a href="https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%B7%A5%E4%B8%9A%E5%85%9A/8997718" class="broken_link"> Industrial Party</a> that have produced fertile debates and maintain varying degrees of independence from CCP doctrine. Some of these have proven more influential than their Western counterparts; their debates reach vast audiences within China. At any rate, within the overall framework of China’s cybersovereignty there has grown a self-governing intellectual world that should not be ignored or dismissed.</p>
<p>The dominant presumption in the West has been that China’s regulation of the internet is a rearguard attempt by an authoritarian regime that has far outlived its welcome to prevent the inevitable emergence of an independent civil society mediated by a free and open internet. As an industrial policy of the public sphere, however, the intended results of Chinese cybersovereignty are more far-reaching and, likely, quite effective. As anyone familiar with it can attest, the Chinese internet has its own distinctive idiosyncrasies quite apart from the shadow of government censorship.</p>
<p>Yet for all that, it is demonstrably autonomous; far from sterile, its climate is even enduringly vital. This vitality is what has allowed it to serve the CCP as a tangible gauge of Chinese public opinion and an information-gathering network: in identifying cases of interest, Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=6yrTDwAAQBAJ&amp;lpg=PT398&amp;ots=p2xyJd5GEL&amp;dq=death%20sentence%20rail%20China%20wenzhou%20internet&amp;pg=PT399#v=onepage&amp;q=%22Netizens'%20human%20flesh%20searches%22&amp;f=false">relied heavily</a> upon distributed reports by internet users. The internet’s capacity to create overall political fragmentation and stasis, however, is tightly limited.</p>
<p>These are merely concrete benefits that China derives from cybersovereignty and not moral justifications for China’s policy. Given heightening American strategic competition with China, however, there must be some coherent Western response to the challenge of China&#8217;s model of cultural regulation. An important starting step would be the recognition that the status quo of an internet regulated solely by private interests can be a liability for effective governance. In the context of an internet riven in the West by private social media amplifying a spiral of internal conflict, the old nostrums about the intrinsic potentiality of cyberspace to construct a free and rational world are increasingly hollow.</p>
<p>The decisive questions in this struggle for the future of cyberspace are: can an open internet function not simply as a vector for the power plays of American political interests, but as a space of genuine cultural productivity&#8212;that is, as something that it is possible to order towards <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2020/04/30/its-time-to-build-for-good/">the good</a>? More fundamentally: is there anything now to be gained from openness to the West?</p>
<p>A Western answer to these questions can begin only by admitting the reality of cyberspace as a strategic terrain requiring public oversight&#8212;and laying the groundwork for an industrial policy that can effectively govern its own public sphere.</p>
<div class="author-bio">
<p class="author-description">Vincent Garton is a political analyst currently based in London. His interests lie in the intersection of politics with economics, technology, and theology. Follow him on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/sysimmolator">@Sysimmolator</a>.</p>
<p class="author-description">Brandon Cheong is a Singaporean economics graduate from the University of Cambridge. Follow him on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/BrandonCheong1">@BrandonCheong1</a>.</p>
</div>The post <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2020/06/24/singapore-is-failing-at-digital-sovereignty/">Singapore Is Failing at Digital Sovereignty
</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/">Palladium</a>.]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">3339</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Jiang Shigong&#8217;s Chinese World Order
</title>
		<link>https://www.palladiummag.com/2020/02/05/jiang-shigongs-vision-of-a-new-chinese-world-order/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Vincent Garton]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 05 Feb 2020 20:35:52 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.palladiummag.com/?p=2612</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Chinese political theorist Jiang Shigong, accused of acting as the Party's black hand in Hong Kong, has been quietly building a vision for a new world order that appears tolerant of difference---but with Chinese power at its center.</p>
The post <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2020/02/05/jiang-shigongs-vision-of-a-new-chinese-world-order/">Jiang Shigong’s Chinese World Order
</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/">Palladium</a>.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The evidence of Chinese power is everywhere, yet the motives that determine it are barely understood. The perception of the relative decline and stagnation of the West has promoted growing interest in a “Beijing Model” of Chinese governance, but the dissonance between Western discussions of China and the ways in which Chinese intellectuals have conceived of themselves remains as deep as ever. This is true not just among critics of China, who have perceived it as an ideological competitor or totalitarian threat, but also in the disparate factions on both the left and the right. Each has used it as a canvas for their own political ambitions&#8212;a source of hope, of anxiety, or simply an aesthetic opportunity.</p>
<p>During the reform era it became common wisdom to justify this lack of attention by claiming that Chinese people are typically pragmatic and non-ideological, or that official phrases such as “socialism with Chinese characteristics” are empty and irrelevant. Today, another tendency has arrived at the same end by interpreting these labels merely through aspirations already held by Western observers. Some Western socialists have sought, for example, to justify the existing Chinese political economy as a total alternative to the capitalist system in ignorance of the actual theory of the Chinese Communist Party&#8212;which often, instead, emphasizes a tight, non-binary connection between socialism and capitalism that goes beyond the “dogmatic” labels of “surname ‘socialism’” and “surname ‘capitalism’” (姓社姓资) and admits the important role of the “logic of capital” in China.</p>
<p>The party theorist Ye Xianming (叶险明), for instance, <a href="http://www.aisixiang.com/data/75821.html" class="broken_link">specifically repudiated</a> the postcolonialist tendency, developed in the West, which posits the existence of an Eastern path of development unique, separate, and even prior to capitalism: “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” according to Ye, means exactly the advanced and regulated logic of capital, manifest as the particular development of a universal process. Ye’s writings, however, have not reached the West.</p>
<p>There are important exceptions to this lack of interest. One of the most useful and thorough attempts to engage with contemporary Chinese political philosophy has been the <a href="https://www.readingthechinadream.com/about.html"><i>Reading the China Dream</i></a> project, which has published an ongoing sequence of collaborative translations of prominent Chinese intellectuals. This series has shed light on important tendencies in Chinese political thought that are barely known in the West, including the Confucian integralism of Jiang Qing (蒋庆) and the theory of state power of Jiang Shigong (强世功). Even here, however, the asymmetry between Western aspiration and Chinese intellectual reality seems to emerge, unbidden, in the favorable coverage and disproportionate attention given by the project to thinkers it classes as liberals. As broad as the scope of <i>Reading the China Dream </i>has been&#8212;and there will be recourse to it in this essay&#8212;the lingering suspicion remains that academics are most comfortable when they are imagining reflections of themselves.</p>
<p>Jiang Shigong is a constitutional law professor who has established himself as one of the foremost Chinese critics of liberalism. He has contributed directly to the policymaking of the central government, particularly on Hong Kong issues, and has offered among the most authoritative expositions of “Xi Jinping Thought.” In an age in which the star of Chinese liberalism appears to be fading, a more detailed study of the thought of intellectuals like Jiang may offer some corrective to the disproportionate favor in which Westerners have viewed that tendency.</p>
<p>This cannot in itself transcend the basic problems of cross-cultural projection and misunderstanding, which in the end infect not just Western discussion of China, but any dialogue between different frames of reference. Difference, however, is also more productive than identity. It is the task of the history of philosophy to map otherwise hidden trajectories that point beyond the limits of current intellectual assumptions. If all novelty in politics is driven by aesthetic induction, we should search not for pristine reflections, but for cyphers. Jiang Shigong’s thought is worthy of consideration not just because of his explanations of Chinese policy or the possible future that he paints for a China politically and intellectually independent of the Western-led world order, but also because he raises questions that have been systematically under-examined in contemporary Western political thought.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">***</p>
<p>Jiang Shigong has garnered a mixed reputation among those who know him in the West. Best known as a popularizer of Carl Schmitt and, more recently, an expositor of the political theory governing China under Xi Jinping, he has been accused of “embracing Maoism, quasi-fascism, and imperialism,” of being a “neo-Maoist,” of reviving Legalism, and of acting as a “black hand” in Hong Kong. Though Jiang is fond of producing provocative quotations, this reputation is to a great extent a disservice to his political theory, which is entirely systematic&#8212;if certainly not liberal.</p>
<p>Jiang’s constitutional theory is, at its core, premised on the simple observation that a constitution cannot be abstracted from its real political context. Constitutional norms, as Schmitt once argued against Hans Kelsen, cannot defend themselves in the face of a political force opposed to them, any more than liberal freedom can be defended by freedom itself. Observing the <a href="http://www.aisixiang.com/data/32958.html" class="broken_link">2004 Orange Revolution</a> in Ukraine earlier in his career, Jiang saw a government ensnared in political paralysis as it attempted to face down an opposition that had renounced constitutional norms with liberal methods of negotiation and litigation. This was a government that had lost consciousness of its own sovereignty&#8212;the recognition that in a time of extraordinary crisis, political decisions <a href="http://www.aisixiang.com/data/32958.html" class="broken_link">must obey</a> “the will of God, not the constitution.”</p>
<p>It is his Schmittian insight that the constitution itself depends on sovereignty that has led Jiang to articulate the theory of an unwritten Chinese constitution, expressed summarily in a 2009 article on “<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0097700409349703" class="broken_link">Written and Unwritten Constitutions</a>.” The modern Chinese state, he argues here, was founded by a popular revolution that established the sovereign dictatorship of the Communist Party. It is the unwritten historical fact of this dictatorship, not the written document known as the constitution of the state, which structures the whole of the Chinese constitution and has embodied the continuity of the Chinese state through three successive written constitutions&#8212;whether it is inscribed as an “absolute” dictatorship or a “constitutional” dictatorship subject to certain written limitations. When the relative position of the Party and the state is brought into question, as in the “unfortunate” conflict between Mao and the chairman of the state Liu Shaoqi in the 1960s, it is the Party, not the state, that has revealed itself to hold the crushing power of life and death.</p>
<p>The positivist and liberal currents of constitutional reformism that had gained currency in China in the 2000s were caught in a formalist obsession with the variance of “facts” from “norms.” They were unable to move beyond the written text of the constitution to the more important substantive norms established by the unwritten constitution of the dictatorship of the Party. In fact, Jiang claims, the Communist Party and the supreme organ of the state, the National People’s Congress (NPC), constitute two bodies of the people analogous to the “king’s two bodies” described in English law by Ernst Kantorowicz: the legally constituted NPC is limited and contingent; the Party is absolute. That the NPC is a “rubber stamp,” then, is entirely by design. The Party may adopt and dispense with written constitutions as it wishes. The state cannot dispense with the Party.</p>
<p>To a large extent, Jiang has won this argument with the ascendancy of Xi Jinping. “Xi Jinping Thought,” <a href="https://www.readingthechinadream.com/jiang-shigong-philosophy-and-history.html">he pronounced</a> in 2018, “uses modern legal thinking to perfect the Party’s leadership of the state.” If not explicitly phrased as an “unwritten constitution,” a steady stream of communiqués from the central leadership since 2012 has repeatedly reinforced the comprehensive leadership and ultimate sovereignty of the Party over every sphere of Chinese society. The defining characteristic of Xi Jinping’s political program, indeed, has been his reassertion of the state and the Party.</p>
<p>But there is more to this emphasis on sovereignty and leadership than an assertion of Party despotism. If there is a single “hidden path” of political philosophy to be found in Jiang, it is in his treatment of the problem of political space. It is, in fact, precisely this that he identifies in “Written and Unwritten Constitutions” as one of the most important features of China’s “unwritten constitution”: the relationship between the extensive control of the central government and the teeming diversity of localities that comprise the vast Chinese space.</p>
<p>For Jiang, this relationship is embodied first and foremost in the doctrine of “initiatives from two sources,” an “unwritten” norm derived from Mao and developed successively by Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. According to this concept, policymaking in China is to proceed not simply according to bureaucratic dictates imposed from above, but through the interplay of both the top-down initiative of the central government and the bottom-up ambitions of the various different strata of local government. As Mao says in “<a href="https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_51.htm">On the Ten Major Relationships</a>,” “the provinces and municipalities, prefectures, counties, districts and townships should all enjoy their own proper independence and rights and should fight for them.”</p>
<p>The purpose of this doctrine is the preservation of heterogeneity. It is, of course, one of the more poorly kept secrets of political theory that Western liberalism is inimical to systemic political heterogeneity. In the West it is largely the critics of liberalism who have attempted to conceptualize possible ways to preserve and promote the existence of political heterogeneity, but even then, they have rarely dealt in any satisfactory way with the distribution of this heterogeneity in space. Contemporary Western discussions of this problem, like seasteading, Singapore-style city states, charter cities, secessionism, and so on, have tended to focus on the right of competing social programs to be embodied in particular spatial units, while avoiding the problem of determining the setting that can enable these units’ existence in the first place. It is the purpose of Jiang Shigong’s emphasis on the comprehensive leadership of the Party, in part, to provide that setting by establishing a mechanism that can support, coordinate, and integrate these different models.</p>
<p>Jiang articulates this concept at some length in his book <i>China’s Hong Kong</i> in the context of the history of empires in East Asia. The historical Chinese Empire, he suggests, was structured according to a Confucian “differential mode of association” that existed alongside the highly centralized Legalist structure of counties and prefectures. Jiang sees this as in contrast to what he claims are insurmountable divides between political roles that emerged in the West, the paradigmatic examples being master and slave, or noble and common. He claims political relationships and roles in the Chinese system were plastic, and different tributary states could succeed or fail to varying degrees in establishing “states of ritual,” thereby moving along the spectrum between barbarian and civilized. This process was observed from an imperial center that could at any point select between these various different systems and integrate their most positive results. The Chinese Empire was not “universal and homogenous,” but sustained instead by “the pursuit of peaceful coexistence while maintaining differences.”</p>
<p>The world-historical importance of “one country, two systems” is precisely its modern revival of this tradition. Deng Xiaoping’s decentralizing appeal to respect particular historical conditions was not simply an expediency: history itself is the very “source of political legitimacy,” and the application of new models in infinitely heterogeneous conditions is the very essence of governing a large space. Ultimately, “time and history” are “God.” A large political order must function as a setting for the intensive development of local models&#8212;but these local models cannot exist outside the ground provided by that extensive political order. This is the salient strength of empire: not the establishment of a total unity, but the enabling of heterogeneity within a great space.</p>
<p>On a larger scale, it is this framework that explains Jiang’s focus in a <a href="https://www.readingthechinadream.com/jiang-shigong-empire-and-world-order.html">more recent article</a> on the construction of a “world empire 2.0.” Drawing on geopolitical theorists such as Halford Mackinder, Jiang argues here that the history of civilization is a dialectical interplay between the heterogeneous empire form and the homogenizing state. Until the colonial era, the major world civilizations had found their ultimate expression in traditional regional empires&#8212;China in the Far East, the Caliphate in the Middle East, or the Christian empire in the Far West. The emergence of colonialism sundered the remnants of the medieval Christian <i>imperium </i>into new, competing empires that came to span not just one continental region but the whole planet, and propelled the European states into a position of immense material superiority over all the traditional regional empires.</p>
<p>The doctrine of national sovereignty&#8212;the traditional hallmark of the modern Western theory of the state&#8212;emerged only at the edge of the competition between these European-led world empires, bleeding out of their destructive interactions in the European heartland itself. Empire, in fact, precedes the modern nation-state not just historically but also logically, and the sovereign states of the contemporary world are comprehensible only as moving parts of the single world empire that triumphed in this colonial struggle: namely, the American empire, whose defeat of the Soviet project in the Cold War represented the victory of a particular maritime, commercial model of world empire over a land-based, spiritual-ethical alternative. This world empire now includes China itself: “China and Russia,” too, “are situated within the American-led system.” No country can exist outside it: they can only rebel against the empire from within.</p>
<p>Jiang’s concern in this article is once again the problem of political space, the “internal logic of very large political entities.” Empire represents the balancing of a centrifugal logic of diversity against the homogenizing engine of a central state. In the traditional regional empires, this contradiction worked itself out through a slow process of cultural and bureaucratic assimilation. With modern colonial empires, by contrast, this type of resolution was foreclosed by the perpetual status of colonized regions as areas of exploitation with no claim to participation in the metropolitan sovereign state. The establishment of a true world empire has returned this problem to its beginnings. World empire must be able to provide a mechanism for coordination on a planetary scale while at the same time facilitating the coexistence and productive competition of widely different modes of political organization. The liberal American-led world empire is now failing this delicate task&#8212;and so, Jiang argues, it is China’s responsibility, as a dissident force within the present empire, to contribute to the construction of a new model that will be able to maintain the suspension of these imperatives.</p>
<p>Given the antiliberal direction of Jiang’s theorizing, it may seem surprising that he is fascinated&#8212;even haunted&#8212;by Hong Kong. Yet in the context of the “Imperial” question of space around which his political thought revolves, this focus makes perfect sense. Jiang sees an “astute” and fiercely effective model in the historical British administration of Hong Kong. If antipathetic Westerners and the more unreflective of Chinese nationalists both now see in Hong Kong merely the question of managing the decline of a recalcitrant and increasingly irrelevant city trapped in its colonial past, in Jiang’s work the problem posed by Hong Kong is quite the opposite. Hong Kong, if anything, is the most important problem of Chinese politics. The existence and perpetuation of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is manifest and indispensable proof of the capacity of the Chinese political order for experimentality, the coordination of multiple opposite systems.</p>
<p>Hong Kong, <a href="https://user.guancha.cn/main/content?id=153861">Jiang has said</a>, is a “fulcrum from which to lever the Western world.” More than that, as he argues in <i>China’s Hong Kong</i>, the relationship between Hong Kong and the central Chinese government is the template for a future <a href="https://politicaltheology.com/what-is-the-new-nomos-of-the-earth-reflections-on-the-later-schmitt-carl-raschke/">nomos of the earth</a>: “The handling of the Hong Kong question does not mean handling matters arising in Hong Kong, but handling the core issues in the rejuvenation of Chinese civilization.” It is no mistake, Jiang says again, that there is “one country” in the slogan “one country, two systems” rather than “one state.” This “country” is not a nation-state, but a wider&#8212;imperial&#8212;political order that tracks the “edges of an ancient empire.” One country, <i>n </i>systems.</p>
<p>For this reason, the “absurd” gulf of identity between Hongkongers and other Chinese is for Jiang “the saddest page in the tragic modern history of China.” Since 2019, the fires burning in Hong Kong seem to threaten the destruction of an archetype&#8212;the immolation of a Chinese-led reconstruction of the world order before it can truly even begin. In this context of tension, Jiang has warned against arguments that make the present Hong Kong conflict a struggle between competing material systems of capitalism and socialism. He has <a href="http://www.sohu.com/a/361891729_162522">instead emphasized</a> the “postmodern” ideological and cultural character of the conflict, and the need for the Chinese central government to proceed with circumspection. The lethal problem is not, in reality, the contradiction of developmental models: it is the stubbornness of an identity that seems to resist coordination.</p>
<p>This is the contradiction faced by Jiang’s model of political experimentality: the ability to coordinate and select effectively between competing developmental models while avoiding ensnarement in the “postmodern” cultural ambitions that are projected around them. Just as the development of society is propelled by its contradictions, the development of “world empire” can proceed only on the basis of difference&#8212;not its resolution, but its productive suspension. The ability of the unwritten Chinese constitution to deal with the emergence of local identity in Hong Kong is the ultimate test of this broader model’s feasibility.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">***</p>
<p>There is nothing new, even to Westerners, in the idea that there is something in modern China that is radically different and new to the conceptual inventory of the West. The Italian theorist Ugo Spirito, who fell out of favor with the fascist regime for his left-wing interpretation of corporatism, authored a largely forgotten booklet on “Russian Communism and Chinese Communism.” After visiting both the Soviet Union at the end of Stalin’s rule and the People’s Republic of China in the 1960s, he argued that Maoism had transcended the materialist bias built into Marxism. Where Western communists were concerned only with economic questions and had reduced the good life to promoting the living standards of individuals, China had established a true organic unity, a system in which nothing individual existed in alienation from the collective, a total state rooted, for all Mao’s protestations, firmly in the primordial legacy of Confucianism.</p>
<p>Thirty years later, some Western commentators saw in the Far East a dissipation of top-down collective destiny into capitalism and special economic zones: the complete opposite of the dreams of Hegelian unity that had commanded the affection of intellectuals like Spirito. China was seen as the center of white-hot planetary deregulation, unburdened by the guilt, exclusivity, and bad faith of the West. Really, China was <i>consummately </i>materialist&#8212;and that was no bad thing.</p>
<p>These two responses refract through their foreign cultural prisms particular moments in the course of China’s modern development&#8212;projecting the contrasting images of China in the eras of Maoism and Reform. In fact, just as Xi Jinping has sought to synthesize and resolve both of these moments into a continuous historical narrative of party leadership, there is something in Jiang that <a href="https://www.readingthechinadream.com/jiang-shigong-philosophy-and-history.html">speaks to both</a> of these views&#8212;he has emphasized the sublation of communism into an organic spiritual ideal as much as the experimental development of productive forces. What is distinctive, however, is his folding of these perspectives into the question of political space, seeking to justify a comprehensive leadership system precisely in order to promote and maintain intensive, bottom-up organization within an extensive political framework.</p>
<p>Yet it is a mistake to read Jiang as a passive expositor of China’s present self-image. China is increasingly confronted, like the rest of the world, by the prospect of an indefinite stagnation, an advancing gray horizon relentlessly dashing every hope for a new politics. Jiang’s concept of a spoke-and-hub <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tianxia"><i>tianxia</i></a> that can provide the force and the framework for intensive experimentation is, in this context, a <i>critique</i>. It attempts to ensure the continuation of technical and social development, and the construction of novel forms of politics, by manually harnessing the impulse of social contradictions into an engine for the production of new futures.</p>
<p>Jiang’s work has been interpreted as a triumphalist panegyric for the revival of Chinese power and as self-serving justification of the Party line. But in formulating this idea, Jiang is far from acting as a triumphalist. He appears instead as an impatient critic of a social reality that falls well short of this ideal, and that extends all across the existing world empire. The repair of this reality will, in fact, be a planetary enterprise <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=LHTKIY4Id1AC&amp;lpg=PP1&amp;dq=beyond%20good%20and%20evil%20nietzsche&amp;pg=PA102#v=onepage&amp;q=%22will%20of%20its%20own%22&amp;f=false">demanding</a> a “long and terrible will” beyond the limitations of existing Chinese politics&#8212;an enterprise that China can catalyze but cannot complete on its own.</p>
<div class="author-bio">
<p class="author-description">Vincent Garton is a political analyst currently based in London. His interests lie in the intersection of politics with economics, technology, and theology. Follow him on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/sysimmolator">@Sysimmolator</a>.</p>
</div>The post <a href="https://www.palladiummag.com/2020/02/05/jiang-shigongs-vision-of-a-new-chinese-world-order/">Jiang Shigong’s Chinese World Order
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